


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
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RM-4830-2-ISA/ARPA
MAY 1966

**VIET CONG MOTIVATION AND MORALE:
THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHIEU HOI**

J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson




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THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
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VIET CONG MOTIVATION AND MORALE:
THE SPECIAL CASE OF CHIEU HOI

J. M. Carrier and C. A. H. Thomson

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Rand
SANTA MONICA, CA 90406

FOREWORD

This report is one of a series of Rand studies that examine the organization, operations, motivation, and morale of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces that fought in South Vietnam.

Between August 1964 and December 1968 The Rand Corporation conducted approximately 2400 interviews with Vietnamese who were familiar with the activities of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese army. Reports of those interviews, totaling some 62,000 pages, were reviewed and released to the public in June 1972. They can be obtained from the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce.

The release of the interviews has made possible the declassification and release of some of the classified Rand reports derived from them. To remain consistent with the policy followed in reviewing the interviews, information that could lead to the identification of individual interviewees was deleted, along with a few specific references to sources that remain classified. In most cases, it was necessary to drop or to change only a word or two, and in some cases, a footnote. The meaning of a sentence or the intent of the author was not altered.

The reports contain information and interpretations relating to issues that are still being debated. It should be pointed out that there was substantive disagreement among the Rand researchers involved in Vietnam research at the time, and contrary points of view with totally different implications for U.S. operations can be found in the reports. This internal debate mirrored the debate that was then current throughout the nation.

A complete list of the Rand reports that have been released to the public is contained in the bibliography that follows.

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PREFACE

Since July 1964, The RAND Corporation has been engaged in research on Viet Cong motivation and morale, mainly through interrogations of prisoners and defectors. The research is sponsored jointly by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Advanced Research Projects Agency.

This Memorandum is one of several, now being prepared, which deal with special aspects of VC motivation and morale. It takes up the question of VC personnel (mostly military, some civilian) who defect to the side of the Government of South Vietnam. Those who thus rally to the GVN cause are called "ralliers," and are distinguished from those who merely desert to their homes or other hiding places, and from those who surrender in battle. Interviews with all three categories have yielded information for the Memorandum. Defection and desertion are considered in the context of the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program set up by the GVN to integrate ralliers into their newly adopted environment. Suggestions are made for improving the effectiveness of GVN/U.S. propaganda designed to encourage defection from the VC and the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN).

A closely related study is Lucian Pye's RM-4834-ISA/ARPA, Observations on the Chieu Hoi Program, January 1966. Pye's conclusions are briefly discussed below, in relation to the findings from the RAND interviews.

A general analysis of the interviews completed between June 1, 1965, and the end of the year will be found in RM-4911-ISA/ARPA, Some Findings of the Viet Cong Motivation and Morale Study: June - December 1965, by L. Gouré, A. J. Russo, and D. Scott, March 1966

That Memorandum compared the results of the June - December interviews with findings for the period, January - June 1965, previously reported in RM-4699-ISA/ARPA, Some Impressions of Viet Cong Vulnerabilities: An Interim Report, by L. Gouré and C. A. H. Thomson, August 1965.

The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful advice and criticism received from Herbert Goldhamer, Leon Gouré, Arnold Horelick, Stephen Hosmer, Konrad Kellen, Lucian Pye, and Charles Wolf, Jr. Frank Denton provided statistical assistance. David Elliott contributed the useful concept of the "clean break." Special credit should go to the staff of Vietnamese interviewers, without whose unexampled work in laying the foundations of basic data this study could not have been done at all. Ian Graham, as usual, provided detailed and meticulous editing.

SUMMARY

In 1963 the Government of South Vietnam (GVN) launched the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program to persuade and enable military and civilian members of the Viet Cong (VC) to come over to the government's side. The program provides political indoctrination for the ralliers, helps them qualify for jobs and, in some cases, for acceptance into the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), and, in general, furthers their integration into South Vietnamese society.

A series of interviews conducted by RAND personnel with Viet Cong captives and defectors and with members of the North Vietnamese Army (PAVN) have illuminated the Chieu Hoi program itself as well as the deterrent and motivating factors that enter into VC desertions, defections, and surrenders. In addition to 302 interviews, of which 151 were with VC defectors, or "ralliers," the authors of this Memorandum studied statistics of the South Vietnamese government and examined biographical data of 1348 defectors who had rallied to the government between June 1965 and January 1966.

Some 28,000 persons came under the Chieu Hoi program between February 1963 and January 1966. Despite the uncertain GVN leadership and frequent administrative changes in the program, and notwithstanding the physical dangers of defecting and the threat of VC reprisals against the families of defectors, the flow of VC ralliers, though small and fluctuating, has never stopped. In the past six months, it has grown steadily, reaching 2,082

in February 1966--the highest monthly figure yet. At the same time, there has been a probably even larger flow of VC deserters who have returned to their homes.

The data show that the chief factors favoring rallying are the military effectiveness of the GVN; the growing hardships of life in the VC movement; the potential ralliers' war weariness and disappointment in the VC's policies, promises, and actions; the increasingly ruthless recruiting methods of the Viet Cong; and a more favorable perception of the Chieu Hoi program, and of the government and its promises in general.

Though men rally in every province of South Vietnam, approximately 49 per cent of all rallies during 1963-1965 took place in the Southern Delta region. Ralliers come from all major components of the VC military forces, from many civilian organizations, and from North Vietnamese units as well. They include military and civilian cadres, Party members, and regroupees (those who went to North Vietnam in 1954 and were subsequently infiltrated into the South). Although the percentage of ralliers from the Main and Local Force is fairly low (see Appendix C), it is significant that, of the 1348 ralliers studied who left the VC after June 1965, 24 per cent of those who came from the Main Force and 27 per cent of ralliers from the Local Force were cadres. Thus, while a majority of ralliers seem to be of relatively low rank and short service, our data show that men ranking as high as company commanders, and province as well as district committee members with long-term service in the Viet Cong, also rally. As one might expect, the number of

ralliers has increased, as has the percentage of military men among them (from 39 per cent in 1963-1964 to 72.5 per cent in 1965), as a result of the enlargement of the VC military forces, the conscription system (which has brought into the forces large numbers of poorly motivated recruits), and the intensification of military operations.

When asked why they rallied, most interviewees gave more than one of a wide range of reasons. In the great majority of cases, their motives were of a very personal kind; the reasons most frequently mentioned were the physical hardships, the economic needs of the family back home, the desire to evade criticism or punishment, fear of death, and homesickness. Less frequently, ralliers said that they had never wanted to serve the Viet Cong but had been forced to join and had taken the first opportunity to escape. Some interviewees mentioned as their reasons for rallying the desire to escape from GVN/U.S. air attacks, their loss of faith in a VC victory, resentment because a relative had been killed by the Viet Cong, and revulsion against VC terrorism. Still other motives were such grievances as being denied leave, quarrels with superiors, objections to the Viet Cong's puritanical controls over the individual's behavior, restrictions on personal freedom, and failure to be promoted. Surprisingly few interviewees cited VC defeats or losses among their reasons for rallying, although desertions or rallies by other persons were frequently attributed to such conditions.

Since personal rather than ideological factors motivate most ralliers, the attitudes of those interviewed

ranged from continued full approval to complete rejection of the Viet Cong. Though the former attitude was that of a minority, many ralliers gave indications of approving at least some aspects of VC aims, policies, or behavior. Yet the interviews show that in many cases indoctrination is not sufficient to overcome personal disappointment, fear, or weariness, and that once the immediate interests of the individual predispose him to rally or desert home, the belief in VC aims and other ideological factors apparently play little or no role in his considerations.

Sixty-three per cent of the 1348 ralliers whose data cards were examined saw in their action and in the Chieu Hoi program a way of returning to their families and avoiding further combat. This was especially true of men who had been forcibly conscripted by the VC in contested or GVN-controlled areas, of those whose families had moved from VC- to GVN-controlled areas, and of ralliers who were concerned about their families' economic condition. Twenty-five per cent of the ralliers, however, including VC cadres and persons with long service in the movement, expressed a desire to serve the GVN, most of them in the armed forces. Some of these were motivated by anger over VC policies or by personal grievances; others appeared to regard service to the government as a quick way of earning a living, especially if they could not safely return to their homes. To many, the Viet Cong's system of conscription made military service with one or the other side unavoidable, and of the two, the GVN seemed the stronger

members of their family get in touch with the GVN authorities and negotiate conditions.

Of those interviewed by the RAND group, only 74 per cent had known about the Chieu Hoi program before rallying. The other 26 per cent had come over to the government side in the blind hope of good treatment, or just to escape from intolerable hardships and dangers. A substantial proportion of the ralliers first deserted to their home areas, where some of them learned about the program, while others were reassured about it (often encouraged by their relatives to rally) or found that rallying was their only way to avoid being arrested by the VC and returned to their units.

Information about the Chieu Hoi program reaches the potential rallier through different media and channels. Most frequently cited were leaflets and aerial broadcasts, although many interviewees said that the broadcasts were difficult to understand. Other sources mentioned were GVN radio broadcasts, written or verbal appeals by families, and counterpropaganda by VC cadres. In general, information about the program appears to have become fairly widespread; as of 1965, many of the new VC recruits had heard about it while still living at home.

The data indicate that all the propaganda media used are helpful in publicizing the Chieu Hoi program, and that the combination of several media in transmitting appeals and information to the VC enhances the program's credibility and effectiveness. Word-of-mouth communication to the potential rallier from family,

and better-equipped, and promised not only fewer hardships but also death benefits and decent burial. The interviews indicated that the majority of the ralliers felt no qualms about fighting against their former comrades, suggesting once again that even prolonged indoctrination did not preclude this relatively easy transfer of loyalty, especially where self-interest was involved.

The deterrents to rallying that were most prominently mentioned were fear of mistreatment by the GVN; the difficulty of getting away from one's unit; the fear of reprisals against the would-be rallier if he were caught, or against his family and friends if he succeeded; inability to go home to an area controlled by the Viet Cong; tight supervision over VC personnel; and ignorance of the terrain.

The Viet Cong recognize the Chieu Hoi program as a serious threat. Thus, they take elaborate measures to anticipate, prevent, and offset the effects of rallying. They also try to prevent their members from learning about the program from GVN/U.S. or other sources. Although the VC have generally failed in preventing GVN appeals from reaching their audience, they have been able to cast doubt on the sincerity of the appeals and on the promises of good treatment. Consequently, many potential defectors hesitate to rally, and seek reassurance or verification concerning the Chieu Hoi program from relatives, friends, or previous ralliers, especially cadres, whom they are prepared to trust. Not infrequently, VC cadres who plan to rally first have

friend, or fellow-soldier often plays the critical role in convincing him. Next to family influence, the most effective appeal is one from another rallier, especially if he is a cadre or is known to his audience. Conversely, the data show, credibility is reduced when GVN propaganda is contradicted by the VC member's personal experience.

In exploring the most promising propaganda approaches, the government would do well, in its Chieu Hoi propaganda, to separate the task of encouraging rallies from that of political conversion. In the former effort, it need simply appeal to considerations of expediency, self-interest, and survival. After the rallier has come into the Chieu Hoi program, an intensive effort can then be made to educate him politically. In developing the self-interest theme, the propagandist should exploit the fact that the VC soldier is well aware of VC controls and is all too familiar with hardship. In view of his isolation, the potential rallier will need information about the course of the war, GVN/U.S. victories, the attitude of the populace toward both the VC and the GVN, and conditions of the families in VC-controlled areas.

In the short run, government propaganda should aim chiefly to provide specific information on how to rally, to whom, and when; to reduce the potential ralliers' fears about the risks to themselves or, if they succeed, to their families; and to reassure them about the future. The GVN should continue designing leaflets as surrender passes and accepting them as temporary identity cards.

Such leaflets should spell out the rights and duties of each returnee. Intensive use should be made of appeals to former comrades by those who have rallied.

More specific appeals might take account of the susceptibilities of particular audiences and of local circumstances. Such special audiences might be defined by type of military force (Guerrilla, Local Force, Main Force, or North Vietnamese Army), by rank, or by function (as, for example, rear service, food production, propagandists, or civilian cadres). The military experiences of individual units, their conditions of life, and changes in the leadership offer other exploitable vulnerabilities.

The North Vietnamese soldiers constitute a special and important group that is strongly deterred from rallying. The fact that some have nevertheless rallied only emphasizes the need to tailor appeals to these ethnic Northerners and to include them either in the Chieu Hoi program or in special programs designed to meet their particular hopes. For most PAVN troops, the simple appeal to rally, or to surrender in battle, uncomplicated by emphasis on political matters, may be initially the most effective. They may have to be shown that they have options other than fighting a protracted war far from home and risking futile death and burial in an unmarked grave. Rallying or surrender can be presented to them as a means of escaping such a prospect and as an opportunity to settle in the South or to return home. Because PAVN troops are naturally concerned for their families and homes, it is important to inform

them about the reasons for the U.S./GVN bombing of the North and about U.S. aims in Vietnam, while pointing to Hanoi's responsibility for continuation of the war. Rallies by Northern soldiers should also be publicized among the Viet Cong and the Southern populace, as a means of reducing expectations of a VC victory, encouraging VC rallies, and perhaps contributing to tensions between VC and PAVN cadres.

Regroupees provide additional scope for GVN propaganda because they have had the chance to compare life under Communism in the North with conditions in the South, because they have relatives in the South, and because of their desire to see the war end and settle down before they are too old to establish families of their own.

Special radio programs should be designed for the middle cadres, who often have the opportunity to listen to GVN radio stations or to the Voice of America. They should point to the obstacles to advancement in the Viet Cong based on merit, to the difficulties that the Communists face in carrying out unrealistic programs, and to the contrast between VC aims and practices and the resultant loss in popular support.

Appeals to potential ralliers should be paralleled by propaganda directed to the rural population and to refugees. Here, the government should stress the villagers' economic plight and should ask them, and also the refugees, to complain about it to relatives serving in the Viet Cong organizations and urge them to rally, or at least, to come home. Such appeals should be reinforced

by emphasis on other aspects of the war and of GVN/U.S. policy: the hopelessness of the struggle and the likelihood of getting killed; the Viet Cong's responsibility for the fact that the war is continuing; the GVN's accomplishments in pacification, rural construction, and the Chieu Hoi program; and the fact that the objective of its side is to reestablish peace and security in an independent and prosperous South Vietnam. Great stress should be given to GVN programs for land reform and other instruments of economic and social justice, with a special effort to reassure the poor villagers who have received land from the Viet Cong, as well as the farmers whose land was seized and redistributed by the Viet Cong when they moved to government-controlled territory, as to their future rights to these holdings under GVN rule.

Among the long-term propaganda problems is the need for better political reeducation programs in the Chieu Hoi centers. The present materials are often inadequate, as are the explanations given to ralliers for the aims and the presence of the United States in Vietnam. Reeducation courses tend to dwell more heavily on the need to kill the Viet Cong and on reunification than on the GVN's positive aims of peace and prosperity.

The interview data also point up the need for procedures whereby persons who rally on the battlefield or are taken prisoner may be classified as ralliers and allowed to join the Chieu Hoi program if their attitudes and contributions warrant it.

The growing pressure on the Viet Cong resulting

from the intensification of GVN/U.S. military operations, increasing VC losses, and declining prospects of victory are enhancing the opportunity for the Chieu Hoi program to make a major contribution to the weakening of Viet Cong and PAVN forces and to the reintegration of the former enemies into GVN society. As for the United States, support of a successful Chieu Hoi program promises not only to help the military effort, but also to demonstrate that its ultimate objective in Vietnam is to create and safeguard the opportunity for the Vietnamese to build a free and stable nation.

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I. INTRODUCTION

As the conflict in Vietnam has intensified, and since it promises to intensify even further during the months ahead, the problems of amassing, training, and motivating available manpower have become increasingly critical both for the Government of Vietnam (GVN) and for the so-called National Liberation Front, or the Viet Cong (VC). This is so not merely because the pool of men of fighting age is drying up, and all available means are being brought into play by both sides to ensure a favorable manpower ratio and to deny manpower to the opponent; it is so even more because of the need to ensure that the necessary political gains are made from the performance of military and paramilitary formations, and that the military aspects of the struggle are so managed as to promote desired political results.

Fighting effectiveness on either side, not to mention staying power in adversity, is heightened if there is strong political resolve on the part of the fighting forces. Indeed, fighting effectiveness and endurance may be taken as a presumptive indicator of the presence of cohesive political values. Action such as defection to the GVN weakens the Front by more than the loss of a military effective. There is a political loss as well. If the defector is a person of importance or rank, the political loss is all the greater, sometimes dramatically so. Programs to encourage defection, desertion, and surrender on the opponent's side can be crucial, especially for a government like the GVN which

hopes not only to defeat and disarm the enemy but also to create the political conditions for a viable nation.

Since early 1963, the Government of Vietnam has been running a program to induce defection from Viet Cong ranks, i.e., "rallying" to the GVN side. More or less aptly called Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms"), the program includes promises to receive with clemency and leniency persons who have given service if not loyalty to the VC, but who wish to rally to the government. The program also offers hopes of jobs, retraining, resettlement, political re-education, and reintegration into legitimate society. Possibly most important of all, the program offers prospects of escape from fear and hardship, and of return home.

This Memorandum examines the Chieu Hoi program, and the political functions associated with desertion, defection, and surrender, as well as some related aspects of nation-building, primarily through interviews with persons formerly in the Viet Cong or in the North Vietnamese army (usually referred to as the People's Army of Vietnam or PAVN), and secondarily through a study of 1348 census cards covering ex-VC coming in between July 1 and December 31, 1965. In addition, some of the Vietnamese government statistics on ralliers have been examined.

Pursued with varying support from the central political and military leaders, the Chieu Hoi program has had varying success in persuading persons in the VC to "rally" to the government cause. Between February 1, 1963 and January 7, 1966, some 28,300 came under the program, with monthly totals reaching over 1500 to a low

of 100, but varying for 16 of the 33 months between 400 and 800. November 1965 saw 1534 returnees; February 1966 saw 2082. Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky announced on January 15, 1966, that 7000 persons had come under the program during the preceding six months.¹ No month was without its ralliers, no matter what the troubles of the Chieu Hoi program, the achievements and prospects of the VC or the government, or the state of other incentives or deterrents to rallying. These figures for ralliers are probably exceeded by the number of deserters from the VC (who usually return to their villages) and by the number of prisoners of war. Nevertheless they show an unending if fluctuating stream of persons who prefer to leave the VC despite Communist control systems, great physical danger to self, family, and comrades, and economic deprivations.

These small rates of rallying are damaging symbolically as well as operationally to the VC. Symbolically, this flow is a constant demonstration that there are those who reject the Front, its policies, its programs, and its people. Because the approach to the rallier has often appealed to his loyalty--and the notion of rallying includes the idea of asserting political loyalty to the legitimate government and its cause--the act of rallying can be treated as a political testimonial. Whenever cadres rally, this can be treated as evidence that persons with positions and careers at stake, many of whom have been rewarded for their diligence and political correctness, have lost their political faith, or their confidence in victory, or both.

¹Congressional Record, January 24, 1966, pp. 956 ff.

Operationally, the flow of ralliers works tangible harm to the Front, and brings tangible benefits to the GVN. Rallying deprives the Front of manpower in a manner safer for US/GVN troops than having to kill all opposing forces. Small as the numbers involved may be, their loss hurts the VC because the fact of rallying and the threat of more rallying put a strain on the VC control apparatus. They call for constant counter-measures that require additional efforts on the part of the control cadres, while these very measures may produce increased resentment and disaffection among those brought under suspicion and increased restrictions. Moreover, ralliers provide useful and occasionally important intelligence. Finally, they provide the GVN with a flow of material for its propaganda against the Front.

For more than a year and a half The RAND Corporation has been interviewing VC defectors and prisoners to obtain data for a study of VC motivation and morale. These interviews have prompted insights into the working of Chieu Hoi and have suggested ways of improving it. Such suggestions bear on the manner and content of persuasion best calculated to produce defectors; they identify the factors that deter defection; they point to the need for political re-education for present and potential defectors; and they illuminate some of the problems met in reorienting ralliers to life under the GVN. They also suggest points at which the Chieu Hoi program needs to be better coordinated with programs dealing with prisoners and with refugees.

Our interviews with VC defectors (151 as of early December 1965) give an impression of their beliefs and attitudes toward the program while they were with the VC, and of how and why they rallied. The interviews also provide ideas as to why some appeals are successful and some not. The interviewees discuss why they think other men in their units have not rallied to the GVN. Captive VC relate what they knew about the program before their capture and explain why they and their comrades did not rally--or, if they tried to defect or desert, why they were not successful.

The 302 VC interviewees providing data for this study are equally divided between defectors and prisoners. They come from all four Corps areas² and represent Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla units, as well as civilian Viet Cong organizations. Although the majority of them are South Vietnamese who have never lived in the North, some are southerners who were regrouped in the North under the terms of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, and some are northerners who have infiltrated into South Vietnam since 1954. Both military and civilian cadres are included. (See breakdown of sample at Table 1, p. 7.)

Although we recognize that the nature of our sample and our procedures do not permit refined analysis of the quantitative aspects of our data, or the application of our findings uncritically to the VC as a whole, we do pay attention to the rough frequencies of interesting responses, and regard them as useful clues to the prob-

²The GVN divides South Vietnam for purposes of military operations into four Corps Tactical Zones, or corps areas. See map, frontispiece.

able distribution of affect, attitudes, and behavior within the VC. Frequency of mention, moreover, does give some guide to the prominence of events in the thinking of our respondents.

In using our data, we have concentrated on the qualitative conclusions that may be drawn from them. We have especially valued the testimony of observers, formerly in the VC, who are well qualified to comment on factors affecting morale, motivation, and the act of rallying. The testimony of veterans and cadres on such matters is usually valuable, but we have also assessed information gleaned from the rank and file, and from new recruits. The rank and file provide necessary insights into attitudes toward cadres; control systems, morale-building practices, and so forth, as these things are viewed by the most numerous elements within the VC. New recruits, although rarely knowledgeable about the conditions and practices of combat, give valuable information about the villager's awareness of the Chieu Hoi program and about his attitudes toward it. They also illuminate attitudes toward the Front and its policies and prospects; toward North Vietnam, the GVN, and the Americans.

Table 1
THE RAND SAMPLE: RALLIES PER MONTH BY CATEGORIES OF RALLIERS

Date of Rally	No. Interviewed				Civilian	Total
	Main Force	Local Force	Guerrilla	New Recruit		
1961 - April	1					1
1963 - March	1					1
April					1	1
September	1					1
1964 - January						0
February	1					1
March	1					1
April		1				1
May						0
June	4				1	5
July		1				1
August	1				1	2
September	1	1			1	3
October	1		1			2
November	3	1	1		1	6
December	6	2	1		2	11
1965 - January	4		3		2	9
February	1	5	4		1	11
March	3	4	3		3	13
April	3	12	5		5	25
May	4	2	9	1	2	18
June	3	2	2		1	8
July	4	2	2	1	1	10
August	3				2	5
September	4	1	1		3	9
October	6					6
Total	56	34	32	2	27	151

II. THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM: A BRIEF DESCRIPTION

Both British and American advisers to the Diem government had long recognized the value of a program to persuade insurgents to defect and "rally" to the counterinsurgent government. The recent and valuable experience of such a program in Malaya and the Philippines was brought to the attention of the Diem regime periodically. However, no official response came from the government of South Vietnam until January 1963, and not until April of that year was a Chieu Hoi ("Open Arms") program officially launched.

On April 17, 1963, Diem issued a proclamation that still serves to define the broad purposes and some of the fundamental concepts of the program. The background, the explicit offer of clemency, and the call to return are all important. In the words of the proclamation,

the Chieu Hoi Campaign provides for appropriate measures in favor of all those men and women who--deceived, exploited or enrolled by force by the Communists--have a new awareness and decide from today to return to the side of the National Government.

Those having families and means of subsistence will be authorized to rejoin their families, or to reside in the hamlet or strategic quarter of their choice, subject only to the approval of the administrative committee.

Those having no means of subsistence or family support can be assured of the assistance of the Government.

Those having skills and ability--after a period where they become conscious of the requirements of the National Cause, during which they

will have proven by concrete acts their total detachment from Communism--will see their services accepted.

Those who have trespassed against the law and who have already been sentenced, or who are subject to court trial, will have the opportunity to amend and to redeem themselves by meritorious patriotic acts which will justify the extension of clemency to them.

All of our compatriots in the country or abroad who have been victims of Communist propaganda and exploitation, I urge to return and uphold the just cause of the Fatherland and to contribute their efforts, along with those of all our people in order to build, in a militant spirit, the new society and civilization where every citizen will be able to develop totally and in full freedom.

The President's proclamation called forth a spate of propaganda and a considerable amount of activity by many civilian and military officials. The program became widely known throughout government circles, and there was an initial burst of rallies. But this early activity was not followed up by the establishment of a visible, high level, well-organized, comprehensive, stable organization, or by administration vigorous enough to match the early and successful propaganda efforts. Until the end of the Diem regime, administrative responsibility for the program was split among several agencies, under the general leadership of a subcommittee of the Ministry of Civic Action. This ministry disappeared in November 1963, and for two months the Chieu Hoi program had no clearly defined

sponsor. It became a general responsibility of the Ministry of Defense, exercised through the Directorate of Psychological Warfare in that ministry. Administration of the program continued to be the business of lower echelons there and elsewhere in government. In May 1964, however, the government named a Special Commissioner for Chieu Hoi, with the status of a Secretary of State in the office of the Premier. In February 1965, under Prime Minister Quat, a special ministry was created to administer the program, which retained this formal eminence until June 24, 1965. Ministerial status did not prevent the program from losing its national center at Nha Be to the Navy, or from suffering numerous other political or bureaucratic slights that undoubtedly damaged effective administration at the province level. Under the Ky regime, the program has reverted to a subordinate status in the Ministry of Psychological Warfare.

These vagaries in the national administration of Chieu Hoi have been matched by a sometimes indifferent performance at the province level, although U.S. advisers have kept insisting that good provincial centers were the chief key to success. Some centers--of which there were 40 in mid-1965--have been quite good all along; others have not; while some have varied in quality. The quality of the provincial centers has been affected by such factors as the interest shown by the province chief, the quality of the provincial director and his supporting staff, the stability of the personnel, and the quality and promptness of administrative support from Saigon, not to mention occasional attacks and terrorism by the VC.

One former official of the Chieu Hoi administration observed in September 1965 that the shortcomings of the program were due in the main to the lack of cadres, inadequate training of cadres, and frequent changes in organization and leadership of the agency. These changes caused many difficulties to the lower ranking officials, whose capabilities left something to be desired to begin with, and whose effectiveness was further diminished by organizational instability.

Budget support for the program has been relatively small, and even that has been underspent, chiefly owing to lags in construction programs and to the difficulties met by provincial authorities in obtaining the release of authorized funds by Saigon. In FY 1963, out of 34,000,000 \$VN budgeted, only 11,000,000\$VN were spent (about \$150,000 at the rate of 73 piasters to the dollar). In FY 1964, of 100,942,000\$VN budgeted, only 30,300,000\$VN were spent (\$393,000). The FY 1965 budget provided 208,615,000\$VN (\$4,860,000), of which 152,500,000\$VN were spent.

Who is eligible for participation in the Chieu Hoi program? Persons who rally are often called "Quy Chanh," or returnees. A Quy Chanh has been described as "a person who voluntarily returns to GVN control after having actively supported the VC in some form of political and military activity." In practice, the GVN brought under the Chieu Hoi program only persons who have returned to its control by reporting to some GVN official--policeman, soldier, hamlet or village chief, officer, or some higher authority not on the battlefield. The GVN has not usually treated as Quy Chanh persons who have surrendered on the battlefield, or prisoners of war who have demonstrated a desire to work with the government. The GVN has put through the Chieu Hoi program and then released a number of deserters from VC ranks who have reported, at some time after deserting, to GVN officials. Some VC deserters who previously deserted from GVN military service have been sent to Chieu Hoi centers for re-education before reinduction into the ARVN. Although Quy Chanh (returnees) are sometimes referred to as defectors, the Chieu Hoi program has not concentrated on persuading key persons in the VC to betray their comrades by appealing to greed for money or revenge. Such specialized defector persuasion is the task of other agencies.

The terms "rallier" and "rallying" do not describe very precisely the persons who come under the Chieu Hoi program. They tell us little or nothing about political motivations or the activities that preceded their exposure to the program. Among the 151 participants in the program who were interviewed, 30 knew nothing about Chieu Hoi before deserting. Many returned to the

control of the GVN without giving much evidence of a political change of heart. Indeed several "ralliers" retained most or all of their pro-VC political beliefs. Sometimes the terms "return" and "returnee" may be misleading. Some of those who decided to leave the VC had never been loyal to the government; their "rally" testified to a political change, not to reconversion and return to an earlier allegiance. Others, such as PAVN soldiers and infiltrators from the North, had never recognized the government of South Vietnam as a legitimate authority.

While it might be more accurate to refer to those in the program as ex-VC or ex-PAVN, this would tend to obscure the political purposes of Chieu Hoi and to devalue the fact that a considerable portion of those who came into the program were disillusioned with the VC if they were not yet convinced of the political righteousness of the GVN.

III. WHO RALLIES AND WHY?

The Table on p. 21 gives a general picture of the rate of rallying expressed in absolute numbers of ralliers per month, as far as we can derive such a picture from the admittedly imprecise and incomplete figures in possession of the Chieu Hoi administration.³ Below we relate these figures in a general way to some aspects of the political-military context that appear from our interviews to condition the acts of rallying, and discuss some explanations offered by GVN and U.S. officials concerned with the Chieu Hoi program for the fluctuations. We then classify the ralliers in our sample by type of force (Main Force, Regional, or Provincial Force, Local Force), civilian or military, length of service, age ranges, rank, operational area,

³A former Chieu Hoi official pointed out that because of the quality of employees at district and provincial levels in the Chieu Hoi agency, taking and keeping records of Quy Chanh in general has been poor. Especially during times of political instability, starting with the fall of Diem, records in many instances were not made or were not forwarded to Saigon. If forwarded, they were not always handled and stored carefully. This official estimated that out of 10,000 dossiers, only 6,000 would have been properly filled out and forwarded to Saigon.

It is obviously impossible to give any meaningful breakdowns of the earlier data in terms of level of force, age, length of service in the VC, etc., as we have done with those subjects we have interviewed ourselves.

and whether the subject rallied directly from his unit, or first deserted and then rallied. (The details are in Appendix A.) Finally we examine reasons offered by ralliers and prisoners for their defection, for their hesitancy about defecting, and for the behavior of others in defecting or not doing so.

A. RATES OF RALLYING AND CONDITIONING FACTORS

Between February 1, 1963, and January 7, 1966, 28,297 persons came under the Chieu Hoi program. The monthly numbers are given in Table 1. The high month for the entire period was June 1963, when 1,675 VC rallied. The low month, in which Diem fell, was November 1963, when only about 100 ralliers came in. There were 252 ralliers in the next lowest month, October 1964, when civilians took over from a military administration. From that point until Ky assumed power, the trend in absolute figures was up, rising to 1,068 in May. From this high point the number of ralliers per month declined for three straight months. Then a sharp upward movement developed. In November 1965 there were 1,534 ralliers, and in February 1966 the Chieu Hoi agency reported 2082 ralliers, the highest monthly figure scored since the program started. During the six-month period from July 1965 to January 1, 1966, there were 7,440 ralliers.

Not all persons coming into the Chieu Hoi program are civilian or military Viet Cong. Shortly after the program started, the GVN decided to extend clemency to draft dodgers and deserters as well, reasoning that if it could provide a way to correct past mistakes for those

in the VC, it could do the same for those who had left its ranks without joining the other side. (Characteristic-ally, those who desert from the GVN forces do not go over to the other side; they return to their home villages or seek work in the towns or cities.) There have also come into the Chieu Hoi program a mixed bag of persons classified as "VC followers." These people got involved somehow with the VC, but were not members of VC military organizations or in VC civilian service as political agents or liaison personnel. There is another category of non-VC dissidents who have been put into the program for political re-education.

J. M. Carrier has carefully analyzed data from the Chieu Hoi administration and has broken down the total of Quy Chanh into major categories. The following table reveals also interesting changes in the composition of the total through time.

CHIEU HOI AGENCY DATA ON RETURNEES

Type Returnee	2-18-63 to 2-11-65		2-11-65 to 7-1-65		7-1-65 to 1-7-66		Total	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Military	6,778	39.0	2,438	69.4	5,397	72.5	14,613	51.7
Political								
agents	6,112	35.2	616	17.6	1,594	21.4	8,322	29.4
Liaison								
agents	312	1.8	138	3.9	180	2.4	630	2.2
Followers	671	3.9	215	6.1	184	2.4	1,070	3.8
Dissidents	135	0.8	12	0.8			147	0.5
Draft dod- gers and deserters	3,353	19.3	77	2.2	85	1.3	3,515	12.4
TOTAL	17,361		3,496		7,440		28,297	

Combining entries in this table, we see that between February 1963 and January 7, 1966, 83.4 per cent of the 28,300 who came into the program were clearly former Viet Cong, having been VC soldiers, political agents, or liaison personnel. Another 3.4% were classified as VC "Followers." Thus the total of those who had been directly or tangentially associated with the VC was 24,635, or 87.1 per cent of all Quy Chanh. Of the remainder, 12.4 per cent, or 3515, were GVN draft dodgers and deserters, and 147, or 0.5 per cent, were dissidents. The proportion of draft dodgers and deserters has decreased sharply, although it bulked large at the outset of the program (17.5 per cent between May and July, 1963) and remained sizable for the period February 1963-February 1965 (19.3 per cent). During 1965 it dropped to less than 2 per cent. The dissident category has disappeared.

The table also indicates a very sharp reduction in the proportion of VC civilians and followers in 1965, as the percentage of Quy Chanh who were formerly military rose from 39.0% in the two years ending in February 1965, to 72.5% for the last half of 1965. This appears to reflect the growth of VC military forces, the increased VC emphasis on a military solution to the war, and the intensification of military operations in 1965.

What factors influence rallying? The data do not allow us to offer any clear and certain explanation why rates of rallying fluctuate. But they do throw light on certain conditioning factors, particularly the existence and scale of military operations, the relative military effectiveness of the GVN, increasing or decreasing hardships, war weariness, and disillusionment with VC policies and actions,

together with perceptions of the character and attractiveness of the Chieu Hoi program and faith in the trustworthiness of GVN promises generally. Village or hamlet guerrillas do not want to leave their fields during the harvest, and VC controls are especially stringent at that time. Hardships increase for the VC during the wet season. The tempo of military operations on both sides varies with the weather, and so do opportunities to rally. Ignorance of the existence or quality of the Chieu Hoi program has had some relevance, especially before 1965, when a substantial number of ralliers were coming in who had not heard of the program, especially in the I and II Corps areas. In 1965 the proportion of such ralliers diminished, and today this factor is apparently decreasing in importance, as more and more ralliers and prisoners come in who are aware of the Chieu Hoi program.⁴ Awareness of the program, however, appears to be still lagging in I and II Corps areas.

⁴RAND staff member Frank Denton has analyzed the interviews with Main and Local Force members who left the VC before June 26, 1965, after being in the Front for five months or more. He found that for these persons (no guerrillas or civilians were included) awareness of the existence of the Chieu Hoi program had increased. The following table expresses in vulgar fractions the proportion of ralliers and prisoners (Main and Local Force only) who were aware of Chieu Hoi in five successive but unequal periods.


L E F T V I E T C O N G

	Before Apr. 30, 1964	Apr. 30- Nov. 14, 1964	Nov. 14, 1964- Jan. 30, 1965	Jan. 30- Apr. 3, 1965	Apr. 3- June 26, 1965
FORCE					
Main	1/2	4/7	3/4	7/8	
Local		3/5	4/7	7/8	11/12

Sometimes the argument is made that the military or civilian character of the government in Saigon affects the rate of rallying. (See Table 2, p. 21.) The monthly rallying rates are broadly consistent with such an argument, but the interviewees did not mention the character of the regime as a factor promoting or deterring rallying. VC/Hanoi propaganda, they said, merely emphasized that the Saigon regime was unstable and nothing but a puppet of the Americans. Since September 1965, under the Ky regime, however, there has been an upward trend in the number of ralliers. Rallying increased in the first three months after Diem's fall, when a military junta was in charge, but began to drop after General Khanh came to power. There is ample evidence of apathy or ignorance concerning Saigon politics on the part of the ordinary VC soldier and the rural population. This suggests that the military or civilian character of the regime has had little to do with the act of rallying since November 1963. It also weakens the argument that the stability of the Saigon regime plays a direct role, although in our judgment the over-all stability of the regime favors rallying.

Although rallying does not seem to be directly related to the military or civilian character of the regime, a change of regime has regularly brought a change in the rate of rallying--upwards or downwards. Even when one military regime has replaced another military regime, the rallying rate has changed. The direction and amount of the change, however, seem to be related to a combination of other factors.

Table 2



Monthly total of defectors*

*This monthly breakdown is based on weekly data released by the Chieu Hoi Ministry. To make a complete total for each month, it was necessary to split arbitrarily some weeks between months.

We have not attempted to relate our information about absolute rates of rallying to variations in the size of the VC force as a whole. It is clear, however, that with the growth in the size of the VC forces identical numbers of ralliers at two different periods may mean reduced relative rates of surrender.

There is some evidence that the high point in the rallying rate during the months of May, June, and July of 1963, when more ralliers (4653) came in than in any subsequent three-month period, can be attributed in part to the fact that in the period before February 1963 like in the VC had created a backlog of persons willing to defect and awaiting only the assurance of a place to go, a procedure to follow, and a promise of good treatment. There are many references in the interviews to disillusionment with the VC, and consequent decisions to rally that were not carried out until some later date when conditions were propitious. The GVN made vigorous propaganda use of this favorable opportunity in 1963.

The precipitate fall in number of ralliers from the onset of the Buddhist crisis in June of 1963 to the death of Diem seems to have been related to growing distrust of the Diem government. The interviews contain not only negative references to the Diem family's rule, but also references to decisions to rally once the Diem government had fallen. One squad leader, a former Party member and member of the Regional Forces, said that he got word from his father, after the Diem regime had been toppled, that it was time to rally, for he would no longer face imprisonment. He had lost faith in the Front

a year before, owing to hardships. He had heard of the Chieu Hoi program via leaflets, "but Mr. Diem was still in power and I did not like him.... I did not believe what I read because Mr. Diem was a deceitful person."

Another interviewee⁵ reported the effects of the post-Diem amnesty and release of prisoners:

At first when I read the Chieu Hoi leaflets I could understand what they said but in reality I had not seen anything. Later I got some information about the GVN's treatment because some of the members in the combat unit who had been captured and released told me about it. After the revolution on November 1, 1963, a number of the people who had been arrested were released and a great number were granted amnesty. It was because of this that I believed in the Chieu Hoi program.... I knew some of the guerrillas who had been released.

A rallier⁶ who came in on March 9, 1965, said.

When Mr. Diem was overthrown, planes came to broadcast and drop leaflets

⁵A military prisoner, member of the Regional Forces, and a Party member, this subject said he had joined the Front because he hated Diem and was ready to rally because of being criticized many times for failure to carry out directives, and for taking a second wife. He was guilty of listening to Cai Luong--reformed opera--on Radio Saigon, and of reading Chieu Hoi leaflets on the sly. He said he allowed himself to be captured by the Ninth Division soldiers, because he knew of the Chieu Hoi program, and he would not be killed. He did expect to be beaten, and he was; but he regarded beatings as "understandable" and accepted them philosophically.

⁶The subject said he had been a victim of oppression by a security agent of Mrs. Nhu, and had had disheartening

in the village. I could hear only one sentence distinctly. It said that Diem had been overthrown and called on the VC to rally to the GVN side. ... The moment I learned about Diem's overthrow, I decided to return to Saigon.

Another subject, who rallied in June 1964, said he did not want to rally under the Diem regime, which he considered totalitarian and cruel.

The low points of November and December 1963 came when the Chieu Hoi administration was virtually paralyzed with the disappearance of the parent Civic Action Ministry and the blocking of U.S. funds for the program. One Vietnamese official working with the program at that time stated, "This situation directly affected the morale of the Chieu Hoi cadres and it also had an indirect effect on the morale of the Viet Cong fighters and cadres who intended to leave their units.

As uncertainty diminished, as Chieu Hoi propaganda increased, and as the character of the succeeding regime did not positively dissuade ralliers from defecting, the number of ralliers increased during the first two months of 1964 and reached a second peak of close to 750 in February. The second coup, headed by General Khanh, took place in that month, and over the next eight months the number of returnees per month dropped to a low of 252 in October. Though a Chieu Hoi Special Com-

experiences in the VC, being distrusted as a GVN spy. He returned to Saigon within two weeks of learning of Diem's overthrow, but did not rally until the following March because he did not know about the Chieu Hoi program before then.

missariat was established in May 1964--an act that presumably should have increased both the visibility of the program and the credibility of its promises--it was not until the government was turned over to civilians under Mr. Huong in October that the monthly number of defectors began to rise again. The scale of military operations and the onset of the dry season also played their part.

This upward trend continued solidly as the program was elevated to ministry level in February and reached a new high in May. With the arrival of the Ky regime, the number of returnees per month declined for three consecutive months. In September 1965, however, the number was double that for August. There was a slight drop in October, but in November rallies reached the second highest peak up to that time. We may speculate that the drop in rallying during the summer of 1965 was related to fresh uncertainty about the GVN's prospects in general and the status of the Chieu Hoi program in particular, as well as to increased efforts by the VC to take advantage of the rainy season to expedite Phase III operations. The later increase in rallies seems compatible with the failure of the VC to achieve any resounding successes during the summer. Even more plausible is the suggestion that the VC efforts to increase their effective forces, by drafting unwilling recruits and shifting personnel from guerrilla and militia to Local and Main Force units, created additional resentments and fears that resulted in increasing numbers of rallies during the fall.

B. WHO RALLIES, AND WHERE?

Who rallies, and where do the rallies take place? Data from the Chieu Hoi Administration indicate that rallies have taken place in every one of South Vietnam's provinces, and the distribution by Corps Areas (See frontispiece map) of all Quy Chanh who came into the program between February 18, 1963, and January 7, 1966, follows. For comparison, we give the distribution of the VC forces (exclusive of PAVN forces) as of February, 1966.⁷

QUY CHANH BY CORPS AREAS
Feb. 18, 1963 - Jan. 7, 1966

CORPS AREA	Total Quy Chanh		Estimated Total VC Strength*	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
I	2,267	8.0	38,197	16.4
II	4,768	16.9	61,934	26.7
III	7,299	25.8	61,306	26.4
IV	<u>13,963</u>	<u>49.3</u>	<u>70,922</u>	<u>30.5</u>
	28,297	100.0	232,359	100.0

* As updated in January 1966. Does not include an estimated 4000 PAVN in I Corps and 10,650 PAVN in II Corps.

The data available from the Chieu Hoi administration do not permit us to say with any confidence how all the 28,300 who came in between February 1963 and January 1966 were distributed among types of VC or PAVN service, or among age groups. But our interview data, plus our analyses of Chieu Hoi administration records since June,

⁷ The following breakdown of Guy Chanh data by time periods shows rising rates of rallying in 1965 in I and II Corps, and reduced rates in III and IV Corps. These changes may reflect the shifts in areas of most intensive

1965, show there has been substantial rallying from all major VC military elements, from VC civilian organizations, and from North Vietnamese units as well. Among them were significant numbers of military and civilian cadres and Party members. Although most ralliers are of low rank and comparatively short service, our data include interviews with men of company commander rank and long service in the VC (See Appendix A). An analysis of 1348 personnel data cards of VC who had rallied during the second half of 1965--21 per cent of all ralliers during that period-- shows that 24 per cent of the ralliers from the Main Force, 27 per cent of those from the Local Force, and 15 per cent from civilian organizations were cadres. The proportion of military cadres among the ralliers is of special interest because it not only includes persons with long service in the VC who have had heavy political

military operations. Column 1 shows the breakdown for the three peak months of the program as a whole.

DISTRIBUTION OF QUY CHANH BY CORPS AREAS

CORPS AREA	5-1-63 to 7-30-63		2-11-65 to 7-1-65		7-1-65 to 1-7-66		2-11-65 to 1-7-66	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
I	156	3.3	336	9.6	849	11.4	1185	10.8
II	334	7.2	518	14.8	1779	23.9	2297	21.0
III	1427	30.7	1015	29.0	1649	22.2	2664	24.4
IV	2736	58.8	1627	46.6	3163	42.5	4790	43.8
TOTAL	4653	100.0	3496	100.0	7440	100.0	10936	100.0

indoctrination and have a considerable stake in a VC victory, but also because it is higher than one might expect in view of the fact that large numbers of poorly motivated draftees entered the VC forces during 1965 and were especially prone to desert home or to rally to the government. The morale and loyalty of the cadres, especially those of lower rank, are crucial to the preservation of VC control over the draftees. However, an examination of the distribution of these ralliers also shows that the proportion of ralliers from Main and Local forces is relatively small. The high proportion of guerrillas (57.4 per cent) among the 1348 ralliers examined is also significant because it reflects, at least in part, the growing dissatisfaction of the rural population with VC policies, and because the guerrillas constitute the major element of the manpower resources on which the VC Main and Local Forces draw for personnel.

Main Force	5.9
Local Force	6.7
Guerrillas	57.4
New recruits*	4.1
Civilians	25.9
Total	100.0

* New recruits are men who served two months or less with the Viet Cong who were being sent to service with Local or Main Forces.

The analysis above shows an increase in Main Force defectors as a percentage of the total, and suggests further an upward trend (that may not be statistically significant) in the per cent of combined Main Force and Local Force defectors during this period.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>MAIN FORCE DEFECTORS (PERCENTAGE)</u>	<u>MAIN FORCE AND LOCAL FORCE DEFECTORS (PERCENTAGE)</u>
July	3.4	11.8
August	3.1	9.0
September	5.1	13.2
October	5.9	12.7
November	8.6	13.4
December	9.5	15.8

About 17 per cent of the sample were 17 years of age or younger. Since the VC supposedly follow the GVN draft age, and hence normally do not draft personnel under 18, this suggests a manpower problem. Moreover, since only 4.1 per cent were classed as new recruits, it is likely that a substantial number of this younger age group were serving as part of the hamlet militia--partly to replace the older members sent away to the Local and Main Forces and partly because of the general buildup of VC forces. In the sample there were many

men who rallied rather than be transferred from guerrilla units to the Main Force.⁸

The sample of 1348 Quy Chanh yields the following age distribution:

<u>AGE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
12-17	235
18-23	452
24-29	325
30-35	206
36-41	73
42-47	35
48-53	12
54-59	6
<u>60-64</u>	<u>4</u>
TOTAL	1348

⁸Two in the sample were only 12; four, only 13. Two were 64. The largest single age class was 18, with 102, but 93 were 17. For further breakdown, see Appendix C.

C. PROBLEMS OF MOTIVATION

Why They Say They Defect

For convenience in approaching the problems of motivation to remain in the Front or to leave it, it is useful to think of the VC as divided into three categories, according to their attitudes to the Front: first, those who remain firm in their commitment to the Front, coupling dependable execution of Front tasks with continuing emotional and intellectual acceptance of the Front's cause; second, those who may remain dependable in wide areas of behavior, and who may continue to accept some of the ideology of the Front, but who are wavering in their faith and in their continued active commitment to the movement; and third, those who remain in the Front although they have decided to rally or to desert, but who have not yet found an opportunity to escape. A subclass of the last group claim they have never accepted the Front's ideology and program, but have been waiting for an opportunity to escape from the start of their time in the VC.

Although we have no precise figures on the relative size of these classes, the testimony of our respondents and the proved effectiveness of some VC units in battle suggest that the first class is still disturbingly large. The interviews, however, lead us to believe that both the second and third classes are sizable and growing, and that opportunities exist for us to hasten their growth.

The evidence from our interviews does not give us any sure explanation of the reasons why VC of the first

class remain committed to their cause; nor does it suggest any special ways to break that commitment. Both the ralliers and prisoners of war among our subjects, especially those of higher rank, continue to impute to the higher VC cadres hope in a VC victory, faith in the rightness of VC goals, hatred and contempt for the GVN, and implacable opposition to United States presence in Vietnam. Similar beliefs are imputed to some of the more experienced and indoctrinated lower cadres and rank and file. It is plausible to infer that the hard-core types have more faith than the rest in the efficacy of their strategy of protracted war, and in the possibility that the United States cannot cope with a prolonged "people's war."

It is often suggested that, in an insurgent movement experiencing severe difficulties and lowered long-term expectations of victory, higher cadres may tend to desert earlier than lower cadres or rank and file, simply because they have access to more information about the current and probable future situation. The lower to middle cadres in our sample who deserted did so not because of ideological wavering, but because they considered that their personal interests were endangered or frustrated. So far, there have been few if any defections of persons in the rank of lieutenant-colonel and above, and none of these has yet appeared in our group of interviewees. Perhaps cadres of this level are not yet sufficiently pessimistic about their position and prospects, or not yet hopeful of a tolerable future under the GVN, or both.

Analysis of the procedures whereby men are recruited into the VC, and of the psychological experiences of many of them as they move from initial partial acceptance of minor tasks through recognition of increasing involvement in illegal activities to acceptance of full-scale commitment, suggests that at some point many make a "clean break"--recognize their involvement in the Front, accept the Front as legitimate, and reject their former lives outside it. Such persons seem to be insensitive to communications or demands not compatible with the new allegiance. If captured, they remain hard-core VC; if for some reason they rally, they are likely to retain much of their pro-VC orientation. Having been able to make a clean break with an earlier GVN-oriented past, however, such personalities can also break with the VC. The frequency and conditions of such occurrences cannot even be estimated in the present state of the data.⁹

As for the second and third classes, our information offers a good deal of useful insight into currently operative deterrents to defection, and suggests some changes in GVN appeals, programs, and procedures that would heighten both the disposition to rally and the frequency of defection.

⁹The "clean break" phenomenon has been suggested by David E. Elliott, of The RAND Corporation, on the basis of his intensive studies of the VC in Dinh Tuong Province. John Donnell, a RAND consultant, has illuminated the psychological development described above, in the course of his work on the process of VC recruitment throughout the country.

Our interviewees, in response to questioning, gave a considerable range of explicit reasons for rallying, most of them of a self-interested nature, and most interviewees mentioned more than one. The conditions most frequently cited as provoking their rallies were personal hardships, the poor economic situation of the family, VC criticism or punishment, the risk of death, and homesickness. Less frequently, ralliers say they were forced to join the VC, and never wanted to serve the Front or to remain under its control, and took the first good opportunity to escape. (Some tried once or several times before succeeding.)

Other less frequently mentioned motives were a desire to escape from GVN/US air activity, loss of faith in VC victory and VC ability to "liberate" South Vietnam, resentment because a relative had been killed by the VC, and revulsion against VC terrorism. Complaints were denial of leave, quarrels with superiors, objections to puritanical controls over personal behavior, restrictions on personal freedom, and failure to receive expected promotion or other recognition. Surprisingly few individuals specifically mentioned military defeats or losses as a reason for their own defection from the VC, although many mentioned desertions and rallying by others as a consequence of such events. It is apparent that military pressures enhance the disposition to rally by fostering hardships, fears, and loss of hope.

In Table 3 is set out the whole range of reasons for rallying, with their frequency of mention and their distribution by type of service unit.

Judging by frequency of mention and the relative emphasis accorded it by the interviewees, we may identify

Table 3

REASONS FOR DEFECTION

Motives	Number Citing Motive					Total
	*MF	LF	G	C	NR	
Personal hardships	31	17	17	7	1	73
Economic hardships of Family	12	16	11	9	1	49
Criticism/punishment	12	10	7	4	0	33
Fear of death	17	5	4	4	1	31
Homesick	14	7	2	4	0	27
Forced to join	6	7	3	3	2	21
Air activity	6	6	1	4	0	17
Lost faith in VC victory	3	4	0	5	0	12
Disillusioned with VC aim of liberating South Vietnam	4	2	2	3	0	11**
Denied leave	4	4	1	0	0	9
Relative killed by VC	1	3	3	2	0	9
Quarreled with superiors	5	0	2	2	0	9
Objections to VC puritanism	3	2	1	0	0	6
Defeats/losses	1	2	2	0	0	5
VC terrorism	1	1	1	1	0	4
Not promoted	2	1	1	1	0	4
Number of subjects interviewed	56	34	32	27	2	151

*MF - Main Force; LF - Local Force; G - guerrilla;
C - civilian; NR - new recruits.

**Eight of the eleven infiltrated from North Vietnam:
three ethnic North Vietnamese and five southerners who had
regrouped North.

the personal hardships of active service as the primary motive for rallying. In our sample, personal hardship was cited as a motive by a nearly equal proportion of Main Force, Local Force, and guerrilla personnel. Specific complaints included poor and insufficient food, poor sleeping conditions, unhealthy or uncomfortable environment (mosquitoes, dampness, etc.), illnesses being constantly on the move, and lack of social contact (i.e., absence of families, friends, and wives as well as denial of the opportunity to marry and found one's own family).

The second most frequently mentioned motive (or cluster of motives) was concern over the economic situation of the subject's family, or concern over his own economic status and future. Typical among the worries mentioned were a decline in family income owing to absorption of the family breadwinner into the Front and harsh VC taxation, the failure of the Viet Cong to keep its promises of support for the family left behind or to provide economic advantages, and the absence of personal benefits for the individual soldier. A guerrilla cadre, who rallied in January 1965 after seven years of service with the Viet Cong said, for example, that his main reason for rallying was that the Front had deceived him when it promised to take care of his family. When he visited his family he found them living in misery:

The VC cadres had confiscated 1 hectare of rice field which belonged to us and left my wife only 0.7 hectare to work on. The taxes they forced my wife to pay for that much land were not reduced accordingly. In 1961, my wife complied with the Front requirements in crop collecting by remitting 5 gia of

paddy. In 1962...my wife had to pay 15 gia of paddy for each year instead of 10. I do not know how much tax they will force her to pay this year. In any case, taxes will certainly go up.

Surprisingly, as many as one-fifth of the subjects mentioned criticism by peers or superiors as a main or contributing motive for their defection. An Assistant Platoon Leader, who rallied from the Local Force in April 1965, discussed the effect of "self-criticism" (Kiem Thao) sessions as follows:

The self-criticism sessions were designed to indoctrinate us and to force us to conform to the mold and the organization of the Front. They robbed us of our freedom. I didn't like the self-criticism sessions because the VC used them to force us to act in the way they wanted us to.

Another subject, who rallied from the Main Force in May 1965 and seems to have enjoyed a much easier life than many, complained that the criticism he constantly endured was an attempt to deny him any freedom to choose what to do with his off duty hours.

It may be significant that very few rallied from that relatively small group in our total sample who felt that the self-criticism sessions were either beneficial to their morale and operational effectiveness, or at least tolerable. Some who expressed irritation or worse with the self-criticism sessions did not find them a sufficient reason to rally, partly because of their estimate of the

effectiveness of the VC control apparatus. Broadly, however, resentment of the public practice of self-criticism appears to have constituted a significant motive to rally, especially in conjunction with other frictions or grievances.

Another combination of motives for rallying is fear of death in combat and loss of faith in a Viet Cong final victory. Fear of death is especially marked among Main Force respondents, probably reflecting the growing military pressure on the Main Forces and their increasing losses. Loss of faith in VC victory has appeared increasingly in the interviews as a motive for defecting since February, 1965, with commencement of bombing of North Vietnam and the increasing deployment of American air and ground forces in the South. While none of the 57 subjects interviewed who had rallied prior to that time mentioned this motive, 10 of the 43 interviewed who rallied during March, April, and May of 1965, did so. A local Force soldier who rallied in March 1965 expressed his feelings in this way:

After two years of service in the VC ranks, I noticed that the VC forces weren't as strong as the cadres had often claimed, that the VC fighters were always afraid of meeting their GVN counterparts, and consequently [I concluded] that they would finally be destroyed by the GVN Army.

Although relatively few in the total sample of interviewed ralliers specifically mentioned loss of faith in a VC victory as a motive for their defection, the majority of our interviews with both ralliers and captives since the spring of 1965 indicate a growing expectation that the GVN will win, owing to its superiority in weapons. They either do not mention, or specifically devalue or reject, their previously accepted faith in the Communist dicta that in

this kind of war man is the decisive factor, not weapons, that the side with superior morale will win, and that the side with the support of the people must triumph. A few even attribute superiority in doctrine and morale to the GVN. For example, a former assistant platoon leader and party member, who rallied on November 21, 1965, said:

The GVN must win because in the economic field it has plenty of goods; in the military field, it's strong; in the cultural field, it's in progress; the fighting spirit never lags. Materially it doesn't lack anything, and the material is basic. After the operations the soldiers have all the opportunities to rest. People enjoy the liberty of moving. The GVN has a "clear and bright doctrine." The VC's doctrine isn't clear. A lot of families have joined the GVN and settled in town. They are prosperous people. All those who followed the VC have become poorer. The VC will be annihilated (tieu diet) because materially they suffer many shortages. The GVN will win because materially it has everything.

Another man, a former platoon leader and party member who rallied on August 2, 1965, pointed out that, although the Front troops were more fully indoctrinated than the GVN soldiers and still had on the whole better morale, that morale had deteriorated somewhat. He went on:

I would say that the GVN is winning, and the factor that contributes most to this victory is the presence of airplanes in the South. Nothing is more effective than bombs in destroying the morale of the men. The Front people are not much frightened of artillery, and even less of GVN troops....Our minds were constantly occupied with the thoughts of airplanes.

Belief in an ultimate VC victory does not always prevent an individual from rallying. A few of our interviewees told us that they rallied despite the fact they still expected the VC to win. They explained this seeming anomaly by pointing out that victory would be too far in the future; that they personally would be dead long before it; or that they would be too old and worn out to enjoy it. In most such cases, immediate personal considerations of interest and safety completely overrode any concern over probable future developments--including VC punishments that would be visited on them as ralliers in case the VC did win.

Although more and more of our respondents are expressing expectations of an ultimate GVN victory, not all of these specifically cite this judgment as a motive for their rally. This difference is probably due to the fact that rallying is primarily motivated or deterred by very personal and immediate interests, and few among our respondents expected that either the GVN or the VC would win a final victory in the near future. The question of ultimate victory or defeat is most frequently viewed in the context of a protracted struggle, especially by respondents with long experience in the insurgency. The very fact of protraction, coupled with the respondent's own experience of past uncertainty and change in life in the VC, fosters uncertainty about the future. The VC takes strong and sustained measures to sustain faith in ultimate victory, and to abolish damaging uncertainties. It relies heavily on careful isolation of its units from outside sources of information and from news of VC defeats or setbacks, coupled with a systematic insistence on VC successes and GVN/US defeats. Yet our respondents report their continuing doubts both

about the present balance of forces and about the ultimate outcome. They are impressed--particularly when they have personal experience of it--by the superiority of GVN/US weapons, especially in armor, artillery, and aircraft. And they ask themselves how it can be that, if the VC never suffers casualties or defeats, ultimate victory must be so long postponed. Yet they are aware of VC successes over the years since 1960. They conclude that they cannot realistically assess how the war is actually going, and quite reasonably pay less attention to ultimate outcomes than to the immediate conditions of uncertainty and stress.

Some interviewees became disillusioned on discovering that the purposes of the Front and of Hanoi were not as VC propaganda had pictured them. For example, a cadre who rallied in February 1965, after three years in the Regional Forces in Vinh Binh province, said (at one point in the interview) that there were only two things that made him rally: He "realized that it was a class struggle and not a national struggle" and he disliked "the role of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the South Vietnamese war. Their final purpose was the same as the purpose of the Americans on the GVN side, to take control over the Vietnamese people." (Earlier in the interview he had mentioned hardships as a main reason for his disillusionment with the Front.)

Some of the South Vietnamese regroupes and several ethnic North Vietnamese infiltrators, who rallied, mentioned as a motive for defection their disillusionment when they came South. They found they were not universally welcomed as liberators in the South and that they

were fighting other Vietnamese. They discovered that the area under VC control was much smaller than they had been led to believe by Hanoi's propaganda. Furthermore, conditions in the South were much better than they had been led to expect before they left the North. On the liberation of South Vietnam, an ethnic North Vietnamese who rallied in March 1965 stated that "the VC said we came South to liberate the people. However, I found that we did not liberate the people when we arrived here--we came here to cause trouble." On the economic situation, a regroupee who rallied in March 1963 said, "The Party in the North told us that the people in the South were living in misery under the oppression of the Americans and the Ngo family. However, having had occasion on my [propaganda] mission to Ban Me Thuot to verify that the living conditions of the people were not that bad, I realized that the Party had lied to us."

As mentioned above, defectors rarely give only one reason or motive. Some offer fairly elaborate structures of motivation. Some of the more prominent clusters are given below, arranged as far as possible in order of importance. The clustering may be of some use in suggesting combinations of appeals to desert or surrender, for use in GVN/US psy/war.

Where escape from hardship is the dominant motive, we find in order of frequency the following associated motives: expectation of criticism from peers or superiors, declining expectations of VC victory, fear of death in the VC, fear of punishment, homesickness, and quarrels among friends.

Where concern for family and homesickness appear dominant, the most frequently associated motives are dislike of hardships, fear of death, and revulsion at Front terror and destruction.

Disillusionment with the VC is most often combined with an explicit hope for freedom in GVN territory, with resentment over VC-imposed hardships, with family pressure to rally, and anger or concern over a VC threat to the family.

Where fear or dislike of criticism within the VC is offered as the primary motive, we often find associated references to family influence and to loss of faith in VC victory. One of our ralliers, unexpectedly demoted, became disgruntled when he lost his social status among the girls.

Some reasons for rallying are not elaborated. This tends to be true among the less well-educated and lower-echelon ralliers, though some of these are surprisingly thoughtful. Generally, former VC cadres who have concerned themselves with questions of ideology and of loyalty are more apt to give elaborate and reasoned answers.

A civilian rallier who had been a prison guard and had rallied in March 1965, after a year in the VC, described his reasons for rallying thus:

I had agreed to work for the Front because I was naive enough to listen to the propaganda of the cadres, believing that their victory was coming and that as a consequence I would have a better future. Besides, their promise to take care of my

family during my absence made me decide to join them at the last minute. After working one year for the Front, I observed that it had been for me a bitter disillusion. I was never able to find any evidence to confirm that the Front was going to win. Besides, what hurt me most was that the VC cadres did nothing to keep their promise that they would take care of my family. During my absence, they didn't give even one grain of rice to my family.

This man not only rallied but persuaded a prisoner in the jail he guarded to come along with him, partly as "insurance" that he would be admitted to the Chieu Hoi center himself.

Another subject, who had had experience both as a civilian worker and as a cell leader in a Regional Force unit, rallied on April 25, 1965, from an interesting combination of motives. In describing them, he said:

As for my relatives, not one asked me to leave the Front, because they are all in the Front-controlled area. I rallied because I hated the VC propaganda. I had suffered for so long without honor. I couldn't see my family either; they rejected my request to visit my family. Even worse, they wrote a false letter and sent it to the district saying that I was dead. Later a friend of mine, younger than I, joined the Front. He told me that I was reported dead. This discouraged me and created enmity in me. I also got the GVN leaflets, but I dared not believe [them] for the VC said if a person returned he would be beaten and put in jail very miserably; so I was very undecided. I also heard that Mr. Trinh Khanh Vang, my foster father

when I was in the Junior Cadet School in the Front, was still living, though the VC said he was dead. Many of the former resistance members reminded me of him.

(Did Mr. Vang have any influence on your rallying?)

Yes, thanks to the fact that he is living, I was encouraged to rally, to visit him, and ask him to find me a job.

Another civilian rallier, a propaganda specialist with long and intensive experience, summarized his views on rallying by weaving together almost all of the motives and themes that our study has shown to be relevant:

I rallied because I think that Communism and I are not compatible. Through my conversations with the regroupees I understood clearly how life in the North is. These regroupees told me that the people in the North have to use ration cards to buy what they need. The regroupees, by telling me about this, wanted to show me that the North Vietnamese regime is fair and treats everybody equally. But I myself know that this system is only designed to oppress the lives of the people and to impoverish them. In 1955-56 and 1957, the people had to slave for 11-12 hours a day, and sometimes even at night, in order to have enough to eat. At the present time, everybody is encouraged to work twice as hard. How could anybody survive [that]?

I worked in the propaganda section; therefore I understood very well the VC method of indoctrinating the people. At first I didn't know anything about this, but later on when I worked for the Propaganda and Training Section, gradually I came to understand how the VC transform people into

machines, devoid of all thoughts (except thinking about Uncle Ho and the Party), and ready to sacrifice everything for the VC. Then I compared Communism with the GVN line and policy. Even though there were many things in the GVN that I didn't like, such as the attitude of the low-level officials and of the ARVN soldiers, who were extremely arrogant towards the people, I liked the freedom of movement, of speech, and of religion, and many other freedoms one enjoys under the GVN.

In addition to this, I missed my family and I was dissatisfied with the way I was treated. I quarreled with some of the [Party] Regional Committee members. Besides, I was afraid of death. My chance of getting killed in the Front base camp was greater than if I had been living in the GVN controlled areas. If I were killed in bombings or in attacks, I would be buried at the foot of a tree, and my family would not know where I was buried. And after my death, my name would not be recorded for posterity. In a big engagement, where the VC suffered about 20-30 casualties, the dead were buried in the jungle, at the foot of the trees, and then grass was planted on the graves to erase all traces, because the Front was afraid that if other fighters heard about it they would be too frightened to fight. I thought that such a death was senseless, so I decided to go home to help support my family.

Later in the interview, on being asked whether anyone persuaded him to leave the Front, the subject elaborated further:

My family came to visit me once and told me to rally. At that time I was going through an ideological evolution, but I

kept it to myself. At times I went through a difficult mental struggle. I wondered whether I would stay alive or not if I rallied, and whether or not I would survive if I remained in the Front. My family told me to return home and look for a job. They told me I could hide in some remote areas where the GVN could not find me. I had all my legal ID papers, therefore I could get a job. But if I did that, what would the Front do to me? Even if I just worked to support my family, the Front would suspect that I had defected to the GVN side and collaborated with the GVN, and they would not leave me alone. I was still undecided when some incidents, such as my quarrels with my superiors and GVN "search-and-destroy" operations, helped me to make up my mind. Further, I knew that the war would soon enter its decisive phase, when the GVN would maintain a clear-cut front line between its own zone and that of the Front. I also thought that the general offensive and insurrection would not succeed. Then I decided to rally.

The interviews as a whole reveal that ralliers do not necessarily reject all aspects of VC aims, policies, or practices. Their attitudes both at the time of rallying, and in some cases later on while in the Chieu Hoi program as well, range from continued warm approval of VC aims and policies, to a complete rejection of the VC in all its manifestations. Those expressing high acceptance are in the minority, as are those evidencing complete rejection. Many ralliers gave indications of approving at least some aspects of VC aims, policies, or behavior. Approval was most often expressed of VC aims to free the country from American "domination," to achieve reunification of North

and South Vietnam, and to distribute land to the poor farmers and establish social and economic equality and justice in the villages. Some ralliers presented a completely hard-core VC attitude and their reasons for rallying were predominantly their inability to bear the hardships, their fear of death in combat, or their anger over criticism which they believed to be unjustified. The interviews show that VC political indoctrination is often not sufficient to overcome personal disappointments, fears of weariness, and that once the immediate interests of the individual predispose him to rally or desert home, ideological factors or beliefs in VC aims play little or no role in his considerations.

Parenthetically we may remark that the interview data do not suggest that persons who have put personal interests ahead of ideological interests feel guilty about it, or require to be shown how such rejected or temporarily subordinated political aims can be gained within the framework of the GVN. It appears rather that the ideological component of belief is a thin veneer for many, and is vulnerable to relatively slight abrasions from later experience. Expression of approval for the elimination of American "domination" most often took the form of a provisional and early acceptance. It looked good to the man first coming into the VC, who tended to equate the Americans with the French and had had no personal contacts with them. But such respondents often reported that they had found the Americans to be friendly, kind, polite, and helpful, and told the interviewers that they now believe the Americans have come only to help the government defeat the Communists.

Why They Say They Don't Defect

The most important deterrents or barriers to rallying are the fear of mistreatment by the GVN, the difficulty of getting away from a Viet Cong unit, the fear of Viet Cong reprisals against the individual if he is caught, or against his family and friends if his rally is successful, and the inability to return to homes in areas controlled by the VC. Some of our informants mentioned potential ralliers who feared they might encounter special trouble from the GVN if they returned to areas where their earlier misdemeanors were known. Fear of losing land in VC territory deters some potential ralliers.

VC propaganda systematically instills and reinforces, among those under VC control, the fear of GVN mistreatment if they try to rally. The GVN, say the VC, may first treat the rallier well, but more likely will beat or torture him; then extract all possible intelligence from him; and then kill him and dump his body into the sea. Possibly, if the GVN does not consider his "crimes" to be serious, the rallier may get off with torture and jail. Sometimes the VC say the rallier will be dumped into the sea by the Americans. One military rallier said Front cadres told him that "ralliers were like lemons for the GVN. The GVN would squeeze out all the juice, then throw the peel away." Although such themes were almost always put in this form by our informants if they discussed the subject at all, many of them report that they did not believe the VC claims, because of their general distrust of VC propaganda and the word of the cadres, or because they had neither personally observed such behavior nor been told about it

by a trusted eyewitness. Unfortunately, a number of our subjects could confirm the VC claims because of their knowledge of cases of GVN mistreatment of prisoners or ralliers. Such information has been brought back to the VC by persons who escaped from the GVN, or by the families or neighbors of those who were beaten. However, a number of our subjects who had been impressed by the VC allegations rallied nevertheless. They felt their position was so grim and hopeless in the VC that they had to take a chance on survival, if not good treatment, under the GVN.

Our interviews indicated that two conditions, both widespread in the VC, make it difficult for the potential rallier to get away from his unit and from VC control. One is the tight control maintained by the three-man cell together with the close supervision of cadres and political officers. The other is the would-be defector's ignorance of the terrain and of local GVN installations. VC controls include a rigid system of passes and mission orders enforced by active physical surveillance, and detention or denunciation to a higher authority, if necessary. These negative means are reinforced by positive psychological support given by cell members or higher cadres to the potential waverer. Many of our subjects reported how shrewdly they were watched by their superiors for any outward evidence of low morale or a disposition to desert. They told how promptly the cadres took action to raise their morale or to remind them of the reprisals that would attend any attempt to rally. One immediate and frequent result of such warnings is the redoubling of the soldier's diligence, as a means of covering up his intention until

the moment when he can act on it. Good performance, therefore, can be ambiguous as a criterion of good morale.

The potential rallier is usually uncertain of the disposition of the others in his cell. He does not know whether he will be denounced or aided by them if he tried to rally. Fear of revealing his doubts or his intentions often prevents him from testing the feelings of his cell companions or seeking their support. Even if he trusts them, and believes they want to rally too, he still may fear to confide in them, in case they may later be trapped by the cadres into an admission or a denunciation. The interviews, however, revealed some instances of shared confidences and of plans for a joint rally. (They also produced cases where the rallier had duped his fellows, and some in which he had tried to immobilize or kill them.) Fear of denunciation is reinforced in practice by the often-reported unwillingness of the Vietnamese, especially in the VC, to reveal their inner thoughts to their comrades.

Ignorance of the terrain and of local GVN installations is especially applicable to PAVN personnel and to the Main Force but it affects many other VC as well. A captive sympathetic to the GVN cause told us, "I did not think of rallying...because I did not know my way about. I operated only by night...."

A rallier who had been a provincial cadre responsible for proselyting GVN soldiers emphasized the difficulties posed by both the VC and the GVN control systems, even to a well-oriented rallier who knew his way around.

As I have told you, I was afraid that I might be arrested or shot before being being able to make known to the GVN

authorities that I was a rallier. I had made preparations, but this did not prevent me from being scared when I arrived in Vi-Thanh. I was also afraid I might run into Front cadres on my way. I knew exactly the places where Front guards were posted and I had chosen a route through the fields to avoid them. Finally, I was afraid of VC Fifth Columnists. Where there were GVN agents there were also VC agents, and where there were VC agents there were also GVN agents. This is a principle known to all the cadres. If an agent of the Front Fifth Column sent me a letter that pictured me as a spy, and if he arranged for this letter to fall into the hands of the GVN authorities, the letter would cast doubts on me, the consequences of which were incalculable.

The fear of Viet Cong punishment or reprisal or both is a very real deterrent to those who want to desert to their villages or rally to the GVN. One captive described what happened to two men who were captured while trying to escape from the VC. After they were brought back to camp, a meeting was held to discuss their fate. Proposals were made to punish them severely and even to shoot them. But

the company commander granted the deserters a night to think. The next day they begged for pardon being very frightened, and asked to remain in the unit and swore never to escape again. All the other soldiers were also frightened. From that day there were no more deserters.

The potential rallier is caught at times between the conflicting pressures of GVN demands and rewards, and VC sanctions. He may believe that if he rallies with a weapon, as the GVN often urges him to do, he may be well

treated, avoid punishment, and get a reward. But he also knows that if he tries to rally with a weapon and is caught by the VC, he will be guilty not just of a "weak standpoint" (the charge for an attempt to rally without a weapon) but of treason. For the first "crime," he can expect public criticism, shame, and mild "re-education"; for the second, he can expect severe criticism, detention and stringent "re-education," and very possibly death. Hence, if a man willing to accept the risks of rallying without a weapon feels that he must come in with one, he may be deterred from defecting by the special penalties attending discovery and capture by the VC. This position was reported by a prisoner captured before he could summon enough courage to defect. He said his cadres told him

no one could be accepted by the Government as a bona fide defector if he did not surrender any weapon. The defectors who were accepted would still be drafted into the army, or would be killed afterwards. Therefore I was confused and dared not defect before my father got me some papers.

Such uncertainty, however, does not always prevent rallying. A former squad leader who rallied from Tay Ninh, said:

The VC told us that if you were a rallier with a weapon, you would be treated nicely for the first few months. After that you would surely be put in jail. If you were taken prisoner, you would be killed at once.

(Did you believe it?)

Of course not, because I found a GVN leaflet.

(What did it say?)

It appealed to those who were still with the VC to surrender. It said that an amnesty was set up for each kind of weapon to be brought back.

An expression of the deterrent effect of fear came from a civilian VC propagandist captured in Dinh Tuong Province:

Even if I had had the intention to rally, I would not have dared do so, for it would be a crime of treason to the Party. If one let oneself get caught, one could still live, but if one rallied, one had no chance of remaining alive.

Some VC-instilled fear was based on plausible falsification. One prisoner reported that a political cadre told him that: "GVN Law No. 10 orders the execution of all Viet Minh without exception." Another rallier, a Main Force squad leader who had served in Zone D, said he himself had seen the GVN shoot prisoners. Hence, he said, the VC do not surrender; they would be killed either by the GVN as VC, or by the VC as traitors.

Men with families or property in VC-controlled areas find it particularly risky to rally. Guerrillas living in a VC-controlled village, and Main Force or Local Force members whose families live in a VC-controlled area, must overcome fears for their families and land once they rally to the GVN. For the guerrilla, having to remain away from the home village can cut off the

financial support of the family. A former hamlet guerrilla rallier, in discussing the possibility that his friends might rally, stated:

There was talk among my comrades that they could not heed the call. They said, "the GVN calls upon us to leave and come to it, but how can we leave? We have our land and our homes here. Furthermore, we don't want our fathers and mothers arrested as suspects." My case is different. My family did not own land; therefore I had nothing to fear.

Nevertheless this man's father was arrested because the Front suspected he had persuaded his son to rally. The father was sent to the mountains for re-education.

For the Main Force or Local Force member, rallying may mean the end of whatever economic support the VC was giving his family, as well as threat of punishment of family and loss of land. All defectors with immediate families and relatives in VC-controlled or contested areas worry considerably over the possibility that the VC may do physical harm to them.

Some of the deterrents to defection, like fear of Viet Cong reprisal against the individual, his family, or his friends, cannot be eliminated, although they can be weakened by awareness of potential gains from rallying. Other deterrents, like fear of mistreatment by the GVN and worry over the family's economic condition, can be countered with a well-planned, well-administered and well-publicized Chieu Hoi program. (For some suggestions by defectors, deserters, and prisoners themselves for

improving the Chieu Hoi program and reducing deterrents to rallying, see Section V, below.)

IV. CHIEU HOI IN THE EYES OF THE VIET CONG

The rallier's expectations concerning the Chieu Hoi program - especially concerning its promise for his future - are part of a larger complex of conditions and attitudes that affect the act of rallying. Attitudes and beliefs tend to vary with the party orientation of the individual VC soldier, although not always in the way one would expect.

To the hard-core VC (whether speaking for himself or being described by others), the Chieu Hoi program is a hoax, a swindle, a trap for the unwary. According to him, the rallier may expect good treatment at first -- but only until he has been fully exploited for intelligence purposes. After that he will be imprisoned, tortured, killed, and his body (in the characteristic outcome of these scenarios) dumped into a river or the ocean. In spite of this grim picture, the VC regard the Chieu Hoi program as a serious threat to their movement. It weakens their members, and makes them forget their duty. The cadres also recognize the political threat it presents.

A former clerk in a political section of VC Province Headquarters unit, who was captured August 15, 1965, said:

I was among the first men of the Front to know about the Chieu Hoi program because I had to type documents for counterpropaganda against the Chieu Hoi program. Right after the dissemination of material by the GVN authorities, the cadres met several times to discuss a counterpropaganda program. None of the GVN projects had frightened the high-ranking cadres more than

the Chieu Hoi program. According to the documents I typed, the Chieu Hoi program was very important and very dangerous for them.

(For documentary examples of the reaction of the Front to the Chieu Hoi program, see Appendix B.)

Almost without exception, our informants reported that the VC cadres had taken vigorous steps to prevent their members (or villagers under their control) from learning about the program from GVN/US or neutral sources. If leaflets were dropped, the local cadres quickly had them gathered up and burned. Then they promptly called meetings to instill counterpropaganda. VC or villagers who tried to read the leaflets before giving them up were severely criticized and might be sent off for re-education or otherwise disciplined. Equally vigorous efforts were usually made to interfere with broadcasts from aircraft: the craft were fired on, the soldiers sent into shelters, or the broadcasts drowned out by beating of pots and pans or by shouting and screaming. Similar tactics were used, and punishments meted out to soldiers or villagers caught listening to forbidden radio stations. Whenever a desertion was reported, or GVN/US propaganda seemed to be having some success, the cadres would take immediate steps to wage counterpropaganda, perhaps call a meeting, and work through the daily criticism and discussion sections to repair the damage to morale. One rallier said the cadres strongly condemned escapees, but the soldiers said nothing. Cadre actions after the defection of a person of high rank are prompt and methodical. One of our informants, a former assistant

squad leader, reported that in the famous case of the defection in 1963 of a VC major, Tran Quoc Dan, the upper cadres immediately called a meeting among themselves to "study his defection." They decided to tell the fighters that Dan had been killed by the GVN, but they told the lower cadres that Dan had defected because he feared criticism over the defeat of his unit.

Even some cadres whose jobs seem to have required familiarity with GVN communications indicated they feared punishment if they were caught reading or keeping forbidden leaflets, or listening to proscribed broadcasts. But the data also include instances in which the cadres took no measures to prevent distribution of GVN leaflets or listening to GVN broadcasts. One subject laconically reported that everyone was allowed to read GVN leaflets since "they are nothing but propaganda." Needless to say, reports of this kind are rare,¹⁰ and no information gained in our later interviews suggests that the VC are failing to sustain their vigorous countermeasures.

Ironically, the VC cadres themselves, through their counterpropaganda, appear from time to time to be the potential rallier's sole source of factual information about the Chieu Hoi program. The would-be defector reinterprets their message according to his estimate of probable GVN behavior, and may then decide to rally.

¹⁰ Unfortunately, the data allow us only to speculate whether such instances exemplify simple laxness on the part of the cadres in charge, a judgment that prohibitions would be ineffective, or a more sophisticated judgment that prohibitions on listening would only lead to enhanced interest in forbidden communications, and that

It is reasonable to suppose that captives might tend to look less favorably on the Chieu Hoi program than ralliers. The data indicate, however, a wide spectrum of beliefs among captives, paralleling the beliefs held by ralliers, but including more hard-core attitudes. Among those we interviewed are a considerable number of captives who said they regarded the Chieu Hoi program favorably while still with the VC. Among captives who did not share the hard-core view were persons who said they wanted to rally, but were captured by the GVN before they could put their intentions into effect, or who gave themselves up on the battlefield and were therefore classed by the GVN as prisoners. Such captives characteristically know about the Chieu Hoi program, accept it, and would welcome the chance to participate in it. A large group of the interviewed captives knew about the Chieu Hoi program and knew the cadres' description of it, but were undecided or uncertain about the program because they had neither experienced it nor talked to anyone they trusted who had had direct experience of it and knew the details. Many of these non-ralliers had heard only appeals to rally to the "just cause," or advice to come in and avoid being killed. These were persons who might have rallied but were afraid to do so. It may be safe to infer that there are considerable numbers of VC who might be brought to rally by better information about the program.

the consequent "black listening" would attest to the limited power of the control apparatus. We do have testimony, however, that some of the cadres like to listen to forbidden radio stations, sharing a taste for reformed opera, and were unwilling to enforce prohibitions on their charges that they were not willing to respect themselves.

Some or all of these willing prisoners might legitimately be reclassified and treated as ralliers.

One military prisoner, an infiltrator and party member since 1957 revealed a misconception rarely made explicit in our interviews, but likely to affect many veterans in the VC. He had heard from the villagers that the Chieu Hoi program was good and the treatment of ralliers lenient, but he said he thought the policy of leniency

only applied to the people who have joined the Front recently. As for those who have been against the GVN for a long time, such as myself, the GVN authorities have always maintained doubts about them, and never consider their rally as a sincere action.

The deserters in our group, who found their way out of the VC but who for one reason or another did not rally, included some who knew about the Chieu Hoi program but did not join it owing to fears, uncertainty, or lack of opportunity. Some did not know about the Chieu Hoi program, but found life in the VC so unbearable that they were willing to accept the risks of deserting. Some of these, presumably, would have rallied had they known about the program. Seventy-four percent of the ralliers interviewed knew about the Chieu Hoi program before rallying, and regarded it with favor. The 26 percent who did not know about it before rallying either came over to the government side with the blind hope of good treatment, or were so alienated from the VC that they were willing to risk unknown hardships in order to escape. Some members of this group deserted, and in their places of refuge learned about the program and decided to rally. Others knew about the program

but deserted to their homes, until they felt sufficiently reassured about the process of rallying and their future with the GVN to rally to the government. Some knew about the program, did not believe its assurances, but rallied anyway despite their fears.

The attitudes toward the Chieu Hoi program demonstrated by both deserters and ralliers, as well as by some of the captives willing to rally but finding an opportunity only to surrender, were rarely complicated by refined ideology. Respondents from all these groups shared a general ignorance or unawareness of formal Marxism. At the level of propaganda clichés, however, they revealed a spectrum of views about Chieu Hoi and GVN treatment of ralliers and prisoners, as well as other matters. Some persons still entertained many VC-oriented beliefs about Chieu Hoi and prisoners (as well as other articles of VC faith); others had held but now rejected most or all of these beliefs; still others said they never believed such things, but were forced to join the VC and took the first opportunity to escape.

Finally, it is necessary to mention that the spectrum of attitudes and beliefs about Chieu Hoi entertained by the villagers under VC control or in contested areas covers roughly the same range as that of the prisoners or defectors in our group. Villagers in this category vary from those who accept the hard-core VC interpretation, through those who are ignorant or uncertain about the program, to those who have some opinion of it, favorable or unfavorable, based on personal experience or observation. On balance our information about the beliefs of villagers

with experience of the Chieu Hoi program indicates they tend to regard it favorably, and thus tend to promote rallying. One rallier told us flatly, "When I deserted my unit, I heard people in the village say that there had been ralliers who were kindly treated; so I believed Chieu Hoi."

V. CRITICISMS OF THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

There has been no dearth of both public and private criticism of the Chieu Hoi program, not only from American sources, but also among the Vietnamese. Criticism extend to the philosophy of the program; to the difficulties and shortcomings of administration, installations, and equipment; to the unduly restricted kinds of training offered; and to failures to meet implicit or explicit promises in Chieu Hoi propaganda. Such criticisms, however, are largely absent from the interview data, although the interrogations usually provide opportunities for ralliers to express themselves on the subject of their experience in Chieu Hoi centers. This absence is to be expected, since the ralliers are usually interviewed in Chieu Hoi centers while they are still participating in the program and are receiving its benefits. Moreover, the interviewees, like many other Vietnamese, seem to accept conditions that would be offensive to the point of intolerability to Americans. They exhibit great patience and express understanding even when kept in uncertainty about their future, not fully occupied, and even temporarily neglected.

Though few, the criticisms of the program made by interviewees merit special attention because they come directly from those who have felt the program's impact, and are made in the face of certain psychological difficulties. They point to the need for clarification of facts and adjustment of beliefs, as well as to areas where GVN performance and Chieu Hoi administration need improvement. Although the most frequent suggestions for

charge have to do with propaganda, the main task is to improve Chieu Hoi performance and to keep propaganda exploitation in consonance with it.

One major recurring criticism of the program is that the GVN administrative machinery is bogged down by paper work. Several ralliers felt they were held far too many months at the Chieu Hoi center because of slow administration.

One military rallier who came out in July 1964 told us, in the following January:

It is a good program. It could be more effective. There are many shortcomings.... The Government should do something to alleviate the ralliers' frustrations.

I have been here for 6-7 months, moping around, doing nothing. How long will this situation last? Who knows? Some of the ralliers want to go home and are not permitted to do so. Others want to work, but there is no job for them. Chieu Hoi is a good program, but it cannot solve our aspirations. I can't go back to my family, because my family lives in the VC area. I would like to have a job or be a soldier. There is no job for me, and the GVN does not trust me enough to give me a gun. What do I do? They let me take a sewing course. This is woman's work--I hate sewing! I am very frustrated.

Another frustrated rallier told his interviewer the day before his formal interview, in mid-July:

You know, I am very disappointed. If I had known how I would be treated by the GVN I would have stayed with the VC.... I am very frustrated and disillusioned.

I only wish the Chieu Hoi center could find me a job or help me to enlist in the Special Forces. I am not a VC agent, because I brought my wife and children here with me...and a carbine when I rallied.

Another rallier, a former Viet Minh and VC propagandist, complained that:

the GVN administrative machinery is too slow; it is bogged down by paper work. Consider my case, for example. I have been here for seven months, and I'm still confined to this center. Every day I'm given 18 piasters for food. This is not enough considering the cost of living here. All I want to do is to return home, and if possible help the GVN in its war efforts against the Communists.

A complaint that has turned up fairly frequently among our ralliers is the failure to pay compensation promptly for weapons brought in. There are other tales of minor injustices, like the commandeering of such weapons by U.S. or Vietnamese personnel at the time when the possessor rallies.

Other and probably more serious complaints, voiced in the earlier days of the program, are still made about the failure of the Chieu Hoi administration to find appropriate jobs for ralliers. The interview data seem to show that earlier Chieu Hoi propaganda succeeded in conveying the promise of job placement. Later interviews for the most part do not carry a strong implication of guaranteed jobs. One rallier, however, who came out on July 9, 1965, told us that an airborne broadcast on Chieu Hoi said that the GVN would help ralliers find jobs. The

lesson for Chieu Hoi propaganda is obvious: Be careful about making commitments; be sure that commitments made are honored; and be sure the honoring is well publicized.

Comments on Chieu Hoi by former party members who rallied constitute an interesting portion of the data. Most of them do not talk about the quality of the program. Of the few who do, some accept the program at least by implication. One, a civilian security officer and propagandist, suggested that the most effective propaganda for Chieu Hoi would be to send ralliers back to their home towns to tell about their experience under the program.

Another military rallier, a probationary party member, was explicit in his favorable judgment:

The VC cannot win because the Chieu Hoi program is very good. It will wear down the VC's strength. There are too many hardships. Troop strength will diminish.... The hardships and the Chieu Hoi program will diminish the troops' strength. Their families are poor; they have to go back to support them.

Others, however, were critical. A former Viet Minh cadre, who had also served the GVN and performed special duties in the Front, complained about inaccuracies in the re-education briefing he received in his Chieu Hoi center.

Most of the complaints and suggestions deal with ineffective propaganda. The complaints parallel those made about GVN propaganda in general. Many of our subjects found the propaganda too vague, especially before 1965. It dealt in generalities, they said, rather than concrete

particulars. A former Senior Captain who had been a member of a Province (Party) Political Committee, but rallied in June 1964, said the Chieu Hoi leaflets

were very vague; they did not say specifically what would happen to the VC's who rallied. The leaflets said that the people were waiting for us to welcome our return, and talked about the GVN policy. All this is fine, but the VC who consider rallying are worried about their future under the GVN. They want to know what the GVN will do to them, etc. Due to this vagueness, the VC cannot assess the real situation and, understandably, they are suspicious of the GVN and dare not rally.

Others complained of the failure of the GVN to make a systematic and sustained Chieu Hoi propaganda effort. A skilled VC propagandist who rallied in midsummer 1964 argued that, "What is bad about GVN propaganda is the fact that they don't coordinate their propaganda and that their activities deny what they tell the people." He went on:

Chieu Hoi propaganda has not permeated the VC zones. The GVN Chieu Hoi cadres still pay more attention to the forms than to the content; for example, they send whole groups of planes zooming over the VC zones dropping leaflets but the content of their leaflets is vague and too general. Their program doesn't have continuity....

They don't set up clandestine organizations inside the VC zones. They don't send their agents there to explain the Chieu Hoi program and erase all traces of doubt from

the minds of the VC as to the nature of the program. Moreover, they don't know how to apply their program. There are some VC who rally and then return to the VC zone, because they have been tortured and interrogated by the GVN. Their first-hand report on the treatment of ralliers is enough to discourage their friends who consider rallying. This has an extremely bad influence on the Chieu Hoi program. The ralliers are not trusted by the GVN.... I think that the GVN has to devise a system whereby the ralliers who are sincere will be trusted and their talent and knowledge utilized, and those who are not sincere will be punished. At the present time, a rallier is neither a prisoner or a rallier; he is somewhere in between.

Other criticisms pointed to ineffective use of available media, particularly the under-use of ralliers to spread the word in areas and VC units where they were well known.

VI. MEDIA AND CHANNELS

The interview data do not permit a definitive evaluation of the comparative effectiveness of major media and channels for communications about the Chieu Hoi program, but they do show that leaflets, airborne broadcasts, radio broadcasts, newspapers, letters, and word-of-mouth communications all play a useful role. Each has its drawbacks and difficulties, but each makes a significant contribution to the total communication. We have testimony that, at one time or another, each medium has played a primary role. Despite intensive VC efforts to block them, each channel manages to convey an appeal to some potential ralliers and, depending on the target and the circumstances, each has special characteristics that may play an important role in some cases, but be irrelevant or possibly counterproductive in others. On the negative side, for example, vague leaflets or broadcasts may reduce credibility. Letters falling into the hands of the VC may provoke reprisals against the writer's comrades or family. Newspapers are much harder to distribute than leaflets.

Though inherently liable to error and distortion, word-of-mouth communications to potential ralliers from family, friend, or fellow soldier, play a special role in establishing credibility. Such messages, together with occasional letters, seem to be the most effective means of reducing uncertainties and mobilizing family sentiment and filial duty in the cause of rallying.

Families put direct pressure on VC soldiers when they are home on leave. They check out the local Chieu Hoi program to make certain that their kin will be well treated, and arrange for the proper officials to receive the rallier, often at a pre-arranged rendezvous. Families communicate with their members by letter, but more often by a trusted intermediary. These elaborate investigations, arrangements, and communications all combine to provide the maximum of confidence in the Chieu Hoi program and the feasibility of escape.

The effectiveness of family appeals depends on the family's ability to maintain contact with members in the Front. Messages do get through despite censorship, difficulty in mail service, and the accidents of war. A large number of the ralliers interviewed mentioned appeals from their families either to return home or to rally to the GVN. The interviews reveal that the Front makes special efforts to sever or censor communications between Main and Local Force members and their families. Indeed the Front spends a good deal of time and effort in breaking or attenuating the emotional ties of family. We have testimony from some of the prisoners in our sample to indicate the relative success of the hard-core VC in repressing their own feelings about separation from family, and in getting others in the Front to do the same. It is therefore all the more remarkable that most of the Main and Local Force ralliers mentioned appeals from their families, and almost all said or implied that the appeals had been effective in motivating their defection.

For some ralliers, leaflets decisively reinforced appeals heard via family or broadcasts, and established the kind of faith in the future needed to bring the rallier out. One man said simply: "After I found the leaflet I decided to rally. Before, I didn't know how I would be treated if I rallied."

Another service-company soldier, who rallied in February 1965, said:

I was hesitating between my desire to heed my wife and my repugnance for desertion. But some time later, when I was in the fields, I picked up a leaflet disseminated the previous day.... It said that the Front so far had done nothing good for the people, that it only cheated them and extorted money and food from them. I found that what the leaflet said was true. I then decided to run away.

The most important observation that emerges from our data about channels is that the combination of channels often plays a critical role in establishing credibility. A private who rallied in April 1965 said he believed the message of the airborne broadcasts and of the leaflet he had read on the sly, because he had talked with people who had taken refuge "out here" (with the GVN) and had come back to their village. They said the government was solicitous, treated them well, and gave them subsistence. A new recruit, who had heard of the program before leaving home, credited a combination of GVN leaflet with VC propaganda for persuading him to rally.

Another informant, however, a civilian prisoner, propagandist, and former party member who retained much of his VC political outlook but had begun to doubt a VC

victory, indicated that the repetition of appeals in several media had no effect in persuading him to rally. Five or six times in 1964, he said,

airplanes came to my area, dropped leaflets, and used loudspeakers to persuade the cadres and soldiers to rally.

(Did you believe these leaflets?)

No, I did not believe them.

(Why?)

I supposed it was a psy/war tactic of the GVN.

In spite of this last example, the data generally show that the various media and channels tend to reinforce each other. There is also evidence that repetitions of a given message through a single medium enhance credibility and reinforce appeals. For example, a civilian worker who said he had already been convinced that he wanted to rally by having to carry out incessant missions and by the lack of any reward or any support from the VC, added:

When I saw the leaflet, I saw that I could return to the GVN with amnesty. Then I saw a second leaflet which convinced me to take the chance. I went to my village headquarters and rallied.

VII. CREDIBILITY, CONTENT, TARGETS, TIMING, AND EFFECTIVENESS

Credibility of Chieu Hoi propaganda is not only a function of repetition, interaction, and mutual support of media and channels. It is also a function of who says what to whom, where, and when. The particular circumstances that led to belief or disbelief were not always made clear by our informants. Their responses were often laconic; they reported the fact of being convinced rather than the particular quality of the leaflet, broadcast, letter, or personal appeal that proved decisive. They seldom revealed any judgment they may have made about the context in which they decided to act on this or that propaganda appeal. Nevertheless, the interview data give us some clues about the mutual relationships of the credibility, content, and effectiveness of Chieu Hoi propaganda. They also point to the most effective topics, targets, and timing.

The credibility of our communications to the VC depends greatly on a consonance between the message they convey and the recipient's own experience. Time after time, our subjects, in discussing such a point as why the Americans were in South Vietnam, would summarize what the cadres had told them, and then go on immediately to express a reservation, such as: "That's what the cadres said, but since I had not seen any Americans, I didn't know what to think." They often suspended judgment if they had no relevant experience, and many of them seem to have been quick to change their minds when they had experience that did not support what the cadres told them. When propaganda-fostered

beliefs were belied by their personal experience or by the testimony of trusted witnesses, our subjects seemed easily able to discard them. Our subjects were skillful in drawing conclusions from observed facts, and in testing propaganda claims by these conclusions. For example, they questioned Front claims that many American airplanes had been shot down over North Vietnam while the North had suffered little or no damage. They reasoned that if a large number of planes had been shot down, many must have been involved in the operation; some must have gotten through; and, judging from their observation of the effects of air strikes in the South, they concluded that the North must have suffered considerable damage. On hearing Hanoi's broadcasts about the bombings, or listening to the cadres' accounts of them, they learned that the bombings were sizable and sustained, and they recalled the cadres' earlier claims that the Americans would not dare bomb the North. Regroupees often expressed the concern they felt for their families or homes in areas under attack. They did not fail to conclude that the effects of the bombings were serious from the demands of the cadres that they must fight with increasing effectiveness to win the war in the South, and thus spare the North further attacks.

Not only did many of our subjects report their rejection of VC or Hanoi propaganda when it was controverted by their experience, by testimony of trusted witnesses, or by internal contradictions; they also imputed bad faith and low credibility to most if not all statements made by a source caught in error, unless these statements were clearly confirmed by direct evidence. Our subjects do not

seem to have discriminated between matters on which the source was an authority, and those on which it was not. They tended to believe all the claims or assertions of a source they deemed credible, but to disbelieve or to reject all claims from a source in which they had lost confidence.

Next to personal observation or experience, the main validator of claims is the testimony of the trusted witness -- the friend, family member, relative, or neighbor. As we noticed above, word-of-mouth communications from such trusted sources were often mentioned in the interviews as the most influential channel of information about the Chieu Hoi program.

Standard devices to make communications credible include the use of the authoritative signature for an official message, and the attribution of an intrinsically persuasive communication to a person or institution competent to speak on the subject. In the context of the Chieu Hoi propaganda in Vietnam, none of our subjects discussed or brought up the question whether anyone in authority in the GVN should sign the leaflets. One mentioned that a leaflet which impressed him had been signed by Major General Khanh, but this was the only such reference. As we noted above, the Diem regime inspired dislike and distrust, and no subsequent political leader in South Vietnam seems to have had as much impact (positive or negative) on the credibility of Saigon's propaganda.

The weight of evidence in the interviews points clearly to the conclusion that the most effective validator of Chieu Hoi appeals by leaflet or broadcast is not some

political personality, high or low, but a rallier who is known to those to whom the leaflet is sent. Appeals from ralliers, combined with reassurance from family and friends, appear to be the most powerful persuaders. Ralliers who were cadres are especially effective. Many VC think cadres never lie, and would never set a trap for their former comrades in arms.

This finding about the modest impact of political personalities and the relatively greater influence of ralliers suggests two lines of action. First is the need to build awareness of GVN political personalities and faith in upper GVN leadership; second is the opportunity offered by Chieu Hoi propaganda to combine validation by previous ralliers with authentication by appropriate political authorities.

In very general terms, the effectiveness of Chieu Hoi propaganda is a joint function of the number of Front members it reaches and of the degree of credibility and attractiveness of its messages and promises to the potential rallier. The decision to rally and subsequent action, of course, are also affected by the potential rallier's freedom to act. The effectiveness of the propaganda also depends on the predisposition and consequent receptivity of the potential rallier. Those who made a "clean break" from the GVN were probably not aware of the communications at all; or, if they were, rejected them out of hand. But those who were already disaffected, and seeking a way out, were especially alert to any information that would help them escape the VC.

The interviews with both ralliers and prisoners testify to the attractiveness of the Chieu Hoi appeals, even when the potential rallier has not dared to act on them, or when his disposition to surrender has been overcome by fears, by VC controls, by ignorance of terrain, and so forth. For many of our subjects, the attractiveness of the appeals has rested on the opportunity to escape from physical hardships, mental suffering, or combat in the VC. For others, it has been the opportunity to improve their economic position, to increase aid to their families, and to enjoy greater personal safety. But for all of them, the act of rallying has been attended by risk and uncertainty. The interviews characteristically include descriptions of the care with which the rallier -- actual or potential -- balances the gains and risks of rallying. Any act or practice of the Chieu Hoi administration that increases the risks or diminishes confidence in the GVN and its promises is likely to postpone or prevent rallies. Unfortunately the interview data, as we have seen, include frequent mention of damage to the credibility and persuasiveness of GVN propaganda wrought by failure to keep promises. Failures to pay rewards for weapons brought in or to give financial help to the rallier and his family are exploited by the Viet Cong in their counterpropaganda against the Chieu Hoi program.

Our figures on the degree to which our subjects, both ralliers and prisoners, were aware of the Chieu Hoi program prior to their rally or capture show clearly that information on the Chieu Hoi program is reaching many but not all Front members. The extent of this lack of awareness

points to the fact that conditions in the Front provoke rallies independently of other considerations. A sizable number of VC have come in without prior knowledge of the Chieu Hoi program. Of 254 subjects (prisoners and ralliers) who were asked about the program, approximately 26 per cent of the ralliers and 42 per cent of the prisoners had not heard of the program prior to the capture or rally. Of those who did know of it, only 72 per cent of the ralliers and 55 per cent of the prisoners had seen leaflets. Only 67 per cent of these ralliers and 58 per cent of the prisoners had heard Chieu Hoi aerial broadcasts. Some 40 per cent of the ralliers and 49 per cent of the prisoners who said they had heard broadcasts also said they could not understand the broadcasts. (These data are summarized in Table 4, on the following page.)

The inference is strong that more Chieu Hoi information would produce more rallies. It can fairly be assumed that among those in the Front who have not heard of the program, some are already disposed to rally, so that information about the program and clear instructions about how to rally would provide the needed stimulus. The available data, however, do not illuminate the relationship that probably exists between increases in Chieu Hoi propaganda volume and the rate of rallies. It seems likely, however, that volume alone is not the critical variable. Awareness of the program has increased through time; many of our subjects reported learning of it before joining the VC, and information about it has spread through the countryside. The scale of military operations, changes in the

TABLE 4. AWARENESS OF CHIEU HOI PROGRAM: MEDIA PERFORMANCE

	<u>Ralliers</u> [*]	<u>Prisoners</u>	<u>Total</u>
Subjects questioned on Chieu Hoi Program	120 47%	134 53%	254 100%
Knew about program	89 74%	77 58%	166 65%
Did not know about program	31 26%	57 42%	88 35%
Number of all subjects questioned on program (254)			
Had seen leaflets	64 53%	42 32%	106 42%
Had heard broadcasts	60 50%	45 34%	105 41%
Had heard broadcasts but could not understand them	24 20%	22 16%	46 18%
Learned of program in other ways	26 22%	18 13%	44 17%
Number of all subjects who knew about program (166)			
Had seen leaflets	64 72%	42 55%	106 64%
Had heard Broadcasts	60 67%	45 58%	105 63%
Had heard broadcasts but could not understand them	24 40%	22 49%	46 44%
Learned of program in other ways	26 29%	18 23%	44 27%

* Includes two surrenderers and one non-defector

effectiveness of VC controls, and changes in our practices in dealing with prisoners, deserters, and defectors are probably more important determinants of the rate of rallying. Appropriate content and timing are probably more important than sheer volume in making propaganda effective.

A favorable or unfavorable context for Chieu Hoi appeals can affect reception and the probable timing of results. We usually asked our sources what they had heard about the Chieu Hoi program while in the Front; some of them told us they had heard of it before they joined the Front, while still in their villages. If the village was contested or under GVN control, the chance was greater that the source would hear or see favorable mention of the program; such an outcome would be less likely if the village were VC-controlled. (A few infiltrators mentioned they had heard of the program while still in the North, but invariably through Communist propaganda.) The simple fact that both VC and PAVN are likely to hear about the Chieu Hoi program before they go into military service underlines the need for vigorous Chieu Hoi propaganda not only to the villages of South Vietnam, but also to the North.

In view of sustained Front efforts to prevent communication of truthful information about the program, and in view of further stepped-up Front efforts to recruit from contested areas, the value of a powerful drive to spread Chieu Hoi information into areas from which the Front may try to draw future manpower seems beyond question. Even if possession of truthful information about the program, the treatment of ralliers, and the opportunities for

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training, job placement, and reintegration into normal life did not result in rallies on the part of Front recruits, it could reduce their morale and fighting effectiveness. Such information could cause the recruits to doubt Front claims that there is no alternative to fighting to the end. Informed VC soldiers would know that there was a way out from the hardships and dangers of life in the Front. Provided that this knowledge was not clouded by reliable reports of bad treatment of ralliers by the GVN, its erosive effects on VC morale would probably be enhanced as the newer fighters found out for themselves the full extent of hardship and suffering in the VC.

There are interesting hints in our data about the effect of context and timing on the reception of propaganda. More than one of our subjects mentioned picking up leaflets and reading them while still in the Front, without paying much attention to them at the time, but later on remembering them in a different light. One independent-thinking and somewhat unorthodox rallier told us he had picked up leaflets very often, but did not "care about them." Later, when he had made up his mind to rally, he "remembered every word in the leaflets." Another effect is the relative success of communication despite immediate difficulties with the channel. Many ralliers reported that airborne broadcasts could not be heard clearly, because of wind, noise, excessive altitude, and so forth, but then went on to give the gist of the Chieu Hoi appeal. Sometimes other evidence in the interviews reveals that the message was reported to the rallier by others on the ground who were able to hear it; sometimes the approximate content of the

message is already well known. The particular broadcast may serve as a sign or a trigger to remind the recipient of a message he has already received.

Many of our ralliers offered suggestions to improve the content of Chieu Hoi propaganda. While none of these was wholly novel, they did refine our ideas on what to emphasize. They suggested the sorts of content that might be more than usually effective in dealing with specific categories of potential ralliers, such as lower-ranking cadres or party members who had been disappointed in their efforts to gain personal advancement or to protect their personal interests. These suggestions are taken into account in the recommendations for improved propaganda, discussed in Section VII, below.

Some data in our interviews raise questions about the commonly accepted dictum that it is not important to deal with questions of morality or of ideology in persuading VC to rally. One early rallier, who came out in September 1964 after serving as a military cadre, was asked why some men rally; he replied:

Material conditions could be a factor but I do not think they are very important. Most of the VC soldiers are volunteers and as such their morale is very high. I did not defect because of the hardship I had to endure in the Front. Even if the GVN promised me ten times what I am getting now I would not have come out if I hadn't thought the GVN was supporting the right cause.

Some ralliers testified they came out, not because they were disillusioned with the Front's policies, but because they realized they were not protecting or advancing their personal interests. Some mentioned a mixture of personal

and ideological motives. For example, a regrouped military cadre said:

Judging from the political situation in our country I thought that to continue to fight with the VC would not help my personal interests in any way because I was only serving the imperialist interests of Russia or China.

An articulate propagandist, who rallied after comparing the programs and propaganda lines of the VC and of the GVN, and because of dissatisfaction with his VC colleagues, insisted on the importance of ideology. While still in the Front, he reported:

I heard airplane broadcasts and I also came across Chieu Hoi leaflets, but they had no influence on me. The leaflets called on us to return to our families, and from this point of view, they did hit home. But they didn't say much about ideology and politics. They didn't reveal clearly the dark schemes of the VC. Many cadres came across the leaflets, but the leaflets could not influence them at all.

A desire for explicit information about GVN policies was expressed by a former military cadre who reported that he had heard about the GVN's assistance programs and about foreign aid, but disbelieved what he had heard because of his knowledge of the difficulty of carrying out such programs. He became convinced that such help was really given, he said, "thanks to the Chieu Hoi leaflets." He had heard of the Chieu Hoi program through rumors, in early July 1964, but had disregarded them until he found a leaflet "which gave me more information." He also believed that leaflets influenced the minds of the cadres.

The counsel of these few men creates more problems than it solves. It is not clear from their testimony how many in the Front find the ideological and policy aspects of affairs of primary importance; though it is clear from the testimony as a whole that ideology in its more elaborate and intellectual forms plays very little part in mobilizing the loyalties of the middle and lower cadres, or of the rank and file.

While it remains important in the long run that the GVN make clear its policies, and its programs for social justice, prosperity, peace, security, and national integrity, it seems clear that the GVN will meet more success in stimulating day-to-day surrenders if it deals effectively with the potential VC rallier's immediate concerns. Our list of reasons for rallying is headed by the desire to escape from personal hardships; hence propaganda should suggest practical ways for the defector to escape in relative safety and reassure him about his future.

Chieu Hoi propaganda (like other GVN devices) has been notably unsuccessful in bringing about rallies of middle to higher cadres -- persons who are more politicized than those lower in the Front structure, and who may be more responsive to political arguments. But it is not certain, either on theoretical or pragmatic grounds, that attempting political conversion is the best way to provoke rallies among the highly politicized members of the Front. A RAND consultant, Lucian Pye, on the basis of his long-term studies of Asian political beliefs and behavior, has pointed out¹¹ an interesting feature of Vietnamese political

¹¹In a letter to the authors dated January 14, 1966.

behavior, and of many other Asians also. It is that the individual can be highly motivated to perform his political role and still think largely in terms of personal welfare. Our interviews show that defectors have continued to use the language and logic of the VC even after breaking with the movement. Evidently they have not been as troubled as most Americans would be by logical inconsistencies between what they say and what they do. Therefore GVN propaganda on behalf of Chieu Hoi can simply appeal to considerations of expediency, self-interest, family interest, and survival, and leave political conversion to the post-rally phase, when it will be much easier. In that phase, the rallier's personal experience of life under the GVN may combine with his desire for self-justification to produce acceptance of GVN purposes and ideals.

The interview data show that the most important obstacle to rallying is uncertainty about the procedures and consequences of rallying. Our subjects sought dependable information about the treatment of ralliers. They expressed interest in how they would be classified as ralliers, and what procedures they must follow to rally. They compared the relative safety of reporting to one or another Chieu Hoi center, or of rallying in one or another area. There is a serious question, therefore, whether Chieu Hoi propaganda should spend much of its time and relatively scarce resources in trying to strengthen the disposition to rally by referring to hardships or to resentment of VC control procedures. The potential rallier in the VC is already well aware of the hardships. GVN efforts to remind him of them are not only unnecessary;

they increase the risk of factual errors that could weaken the credibility of GVN propaganda as a whole.

There is much evidence in the interviews that VC devices for control and for support of morale are counter-productive, and even conducive to a decision to rally as soon as possible. This is especially true among the lower ranks and those with only short service in the Front. Moreover, recent evidence shows that the demands of higher cadres for high performance from lower cadres in a worsening tactical and administrative situation are provoking additional resentment among the latter.

Leaflets and airborne broadcasts should give specific information on how to rally with relative safety, and should reassure potential ralliers about their future. This information can include evidence of weak points in the control structures, but more important is information that will reduce or abolish uncertainties about how to rally, to whom, and when; and that will reduce the individual's concern over the probable risks to self and family of a successful rally. Leaflets also might include praise for the courage and wisdom of the man who rallies.

Continuing references in our data to the fear of GVN measures against "illegal persons" (i.e., persons without proper papers) point to the importance of making up and accepting leaflets as surrender passes, and as the equivalent of identity cards. This form of leaflet may strengthen the VC reader's faith in GVN policies and promises, even where he does not use it to help him rally or to clear himself with village officials. If the GVN takes over a village, a captured VC might have a point in his favor if he has kept such a leaflet, since the very

act of retaining it indicates a certain willingness to risk VC reprisals, and shows some measure of disloyalty to the Front.

One early rallier, a civilian cell leader and Youth Organization member, said:

I wanted to quit the VC for a long time but I could not find a way to quit. I had no identity papers and I could not request any new ones. Then I heard about the Chieu Hoi policy, which made me rally to the GVN. [How did you learn about it?] I heard by the loudspeakers from airplanes and I read leaflets, which I dared not keep as a safe-conduct. I decided I would defect the next time I was allowed to go home and visit my family.

Many of our VC informants referred to the importance of correct procedures and etiquette in rallying. They said they deferred rallying until they were completely reassured, usually by their families or trusted persons, as to how, when, and to whom they should rally. Sometimes the potential rallier asked his intermediary to arrange a definite rendezvous. While such detailed measures may not always be feasible, it is possible to spell out clearly in leaflets or other media, the exact procedures for rallying.

Our informants made some other useful suggestions. One former VC propagandist thought that GVN leaflets

should say specifically what the hardships in the Front are, how the fighters are buried when they die [i.e., in the jungle, under the trees]. They should mention that the names of the Front members will be lost forever when they die, and that their families will suffer a great deal from such a loss.

Another rallier advised that Chieu Hoi propaganda give specific names of those who had rallied, and added that

leaflets should be distributed continuously, and then added an operational point of considerable importance:

If they [the GVN] keep it up and the leaflets contain the true story of the ralliers then the VC cadres, especially those who want to return to the national cause anyway, will check with the families of the ralliers to see if the story is true or not. If it is true...they will rally.

The testimony of ralliers about what they disliked most in the Front offers some ideas for the content of Chieu Hoi propaganda. Many reacted against the restrictions on personal freedom and the depersonalization characteristic of the VC indoctrination and morale-maintenance processes. A civilian cadre said he rallied because he "was fed up with the regime. It was full of deception and I found that the GVN had respect for personality and was lenient." Another, a former student, a recruit who had spent his little time in the Front chiefly in political training, expressed his expectation that he would be "warmly welcomed by the Chieu Hoi officials as were other ralliers... And then [he went on,] I would be able to lead a free, happy life. These thoughts raised my spirits and helped me overcome all obstacles and hardships in order to rally...."

Other suggestions for propaganda content are implicit in ralliers' statements about their hopes for the future. The former chief of a VC military proselytizing team in a village, who rallied in September 1964, had been disabused of an incipient belief in Communism while still in the Front. His wants were simple:

My biggest hope is that we will have a chance to live in peace. I want to live with my family, to have enough land, a job to get money to support my children. I especially want to be able to send my children to a school for more education than I have.

The stated aspirations of the Quy Chanh are summarized in J. M. Carrier's analysis of 1348 profiles of former VC who came in during the last half of 1965. Of these, 1054 indicated the informants' aspirations; 665, or 63%, simply wanted to return home; 271, or 25%, expressed a desire to serve in the GVN military; 165 of the last group wanted to join the ARVN, and 53 wanted to join armed propaganda units. The full range of expressed aspirations is given in Table 5, on the following page.

The fact that the majority of the ralliers wished simply to return home indicates that many of the actual and potential ralliers view the Chieu Hoi program as a means of avoiding further hardships and combat and as a way of returning to their families. This is especially true of persons who had been forcibly conscripted by the VC in contested or GVN controlled areas, whose families had moved from VC to GVN controlled areas or whose families were greatly dependent on their labor. The latter seemed to apply particularly to poor farmers and young men supporting aged parents.

It is of some significance that 25 per cent of the ralliers from the sample of 1348 expressed a wish to serve in some GVN military organization. Among them were cadres and persons with long service in the VC. Our interviews show that while some were motivated by anger over VC policies or actions or personal grievances, others appeared to see in this a quick way of earning a living, especially if they felt they could not safely return to their homes.

TABLE 5

Returnee Card Data on
ASPIRATIONS OF THE QUY CHANH
(1054 Responses out of 1348 cards)

<u>Aspiration</u>	<u>Number</u>
Return Home	665
Join Military	271
ARVN	165
Armed Propaganda	53
SDC	27
Civil Guard	13
Special Forces	9
Military Intelligence	4
Want a job	28
Live in Secure Area	28
Study	31
Mechanics	11
Learn a trade	9
Nursing	6
Other	5
Work for GVN	11
Join Chieu Hoi as Rally Cadre	9
Join Police	3
Join District Services	4
Go to Resettlement Center	2
Enter Buddhist Monastery	1
Show GVN Ammo Dump	1

Some may have seen in this a way of winning favor with the GVN. In many cases, however, the individual seemed convinced that he could not avoid military service with one or the other side and preferred the GVN which seemed to him to be stronger, better equipped, suffering fewer hardships and where he would be paid for his services. Significantly, the majority of the interviewed ralliers expressed no qualms about fighting against their former VC comrades. A similar attitude was often shown by former GVN soldiers who had been captured by the VC, or otherwise forced to serve in VC units. Ralliers from this group did not express any revulsion at having had to fight against their former ARVN comrades. They expressed much more concern if they had had to risk fighting their relatives on the other side. Their motives for defection centered primarily on hardships, fear of death, and lack of faith in a VC victory. This suggests that once the individual has come over to the Government, he tends to accept the necessity of serving the GVN and that VC indoctrination, in some cases of long standing, is not sufficient to inhibit a relatively easy transfer of loyalty, based in part on personal interest, from one side to the other. Many ralliers show that they easily accept the "justice" of the cause and the values of whichever side exercises control over them. This attitude may be reinforced by fear of punishment for noncompliance with the controlling authorities and further in the case of the VC ralliers by the VC threat to kill any recaptured rallier.

In general, our interview data do not show that our respondents are keenly aware of efforts made by the GVN to appeal to special groups in the VC. Most of the responses

to questions about the content of Chieu Hoi leaflets or broadcasts indicate that the interviewee is aware that the Government wants him to return to the "just cause," that it will treat him well, and will help reintegrate him and his family into a better life on the Government side. Such content is often reported even though the respondent does not associate it with the Chieu Hoi program, or may not even know that there is such a program. Since Chieu Hoi appeals must aim primarily at reassuring potential ralliers about the program and their future, and facilitate their rallies, no clear distinction need be made between different types of VC personnel; they can be addressed as a group for these purposes.

But our data also indicate that various types of VC audiences, in differing local situations, do exhibit special susceptibilities to particularized Chieu Hoi appeals. These susceptibilities vary not only by type of military organization, re: Main Force, Local Force, Guerrilla, North Vietnamese Army; but also by rank and by functions. For example, VC rear service personnel often appear to be demoralized by their extreme isolation, lack of contact with the civilian population and the monotony of their work as well as by inadequate food. Transportation workers are discouraged by their vulnerability to attacks, their inability to defend themselves if ambushed, the heavy and often dirty labor they perform and the tendency of the civilians, especially girls, to avoid contact with them because of their unglamorous assignment and their filthy and often smelly appearance. Food production workers also suffer from isolation, exposure to attacks and lack of appreciation of their mission by the civilians.

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the infiltrator has found that he is not fighting "American imperialists," but Vietnamese. Of course, the recent increase in the deployment of U.S. troops and their use against PAVN formations has reduced the potential occasions of this shock. In many instances, however, the infiltrator from the North will still be encountering Vietnamese.

In all cases where Northern troops encounter Americans, they need to be met not only by American military power, but also by information about the true role of the Americans in Vietnam. They should be offered an honorable way out of the war that is compatible with fundamental Vietnamese national interests. It is worthwhile denying the Hanoi-VC line that the Americans want to invade and to conquer the North. Such denials need not be direct, but should be made in the course of asserting the positive goals of American policy. The visual demonstration of prosperity that the Northern soldier may experience in South Vietnam may help him come to a more accurate and favorable view of the role of Americans in Vietnam. The American emphasis on personal freedom can be communicated to him, especially if he observes examples of freedom enjoyed by Vietnamese under the GVN.

The problem of propaganda to regular PAVN units is obviously different from that of propaganda to individual cadres or to small groups sent to beef up VC units originating in the South. The latter endeavor may present the larger initial opportunities. One recent infiltrator who rallied complained of inadequate training (he was told he would learn more on the battlefield in the South than he would in an equivalent time in the North), and of being expelled from a village in the South because the inhabitants feared his unit would attract GVN attacks. Regular

PAVN units encountered so far turn out to be well trained, relatively highly motivated, well equipped, and with a sense of mission or duty reinforced by Hanoi's demand that they must put more pressure on the Americans in the South to relieve bombing attacks on the North. (Not all PAVN elements are necessarily elite. One of our informants, who had served with the 325th Division, said he had been transferred to that Division because he was "stubborn," and that others were similarly selected.) However little PAVN units in the South can do to reduce the pressure of GVN/U.S. bombing of the North, Hanoi's argument about the PAVN role may be useful if the North Vietnamese soldier fights harder against the Americans in order to discharge his anger and resentment against bombing. It is important to inform PAVN units in the South of all the reasons for the GVN/U.S. attacks on the North, with emphasis on the effort to bring about negotiations. Such explanations could channel some of the anger of the PAVN units against their own leaders for their failure to take the route of negotiations and thus eliminate attacks on Northern homes and families.

Common to North Vietnamese regular units, small groups, and cadres is the fact that in the South they are away from home and family, in unfamiliar territory, undergoing hardships and dangers, often rejected by the local population, and meeting an enemy possessed of superior armament and resources. Consequently it is surely justifiable to regard the Northerners as vulnerable to surrender propaganda, despite their fears that the regime may retaliate against their families and that they may never see their homes again if they surrender. Under these conditions, personal difficulties or conflicts with cadres may provide the

critical margin of disaffection needed to provoke rallies (as was true of two of the interviewed infiltrator ralliers). The Northerner may prefer rallying to surrender simply because the treatment of a rallier seems preferable. Political convictions may be too weak to deter rallying, at least during the critical period of decision. Once he has reached a Chieu Hoi center, the rallier will be subject to new influences on his political thinking. If he is anxious to rationalize an act he may have regarded as disloyal or treasonable, the PAVN rallier may offer little resistance to a reorientation of his beliefs.

Some of the most recent interviews with PAVN personnel indicate that the opportunities for psychological warfare generally, and surrender/rallier propaganda in particular, may be rich and growing. Four PAVN soldiers left their unit together. They had no intention of rallying; they simply wanted to desert, and planned to throw themselves on the mercy of villagers. One recent rallier, a company political officer who had served in the Resistance and in the North since 1950, arrived in the South with the intention of rallying. He could no longer stand the hardships, and he wanted to be reunited with his family (whose village south of the border he could see when he had been on duty with a PAVN unit guarding the demarcation line).

The PAVN defectors realized that their leaders had lied to them. They had been told they would fight Americans; yet on their way to the South they were warned they might be attacked by GVN troops. They were frightened by bombing, and sure they would die if they stayed with their units. They were determined to escape. Two of them, captured during the Plei Me battle with the American First Cavalry, heard Chieu Hoi appeals while they were

trying to escape through the jungle. These appeals reinforced their determination to find some way to surrender. (They did, by waving a white flag at American helicopters.)

None of the PAVN defectors was prepared for the hardships of the journey south. They were sick with malaria and beri-beri; they were shocked because those too sick to go on were sometimes left to die unattended at a rest station. They had insufficient food, an unbalanced diet, and not enough medicine. They were thoroughly depressed by finding conditions quite other than they had been led to believe while in the North. No one welcomed them.

Nuances in the testimony of these recent subjects are also important. One is the suggestion that there is more opportunity among the PAVN than among the VC for group surrenders. Three of the subjects were not afraid to disclose to each other their intentions to surrender, and they set about finding the best ways of doing it. We also find a hint that the cadres have more initial confidence in troops who have been longer exposed to indoctrination and discipline, and that less stringent control techniques are applied to these troops. In one unit, it was said, the cell-control device was loosely used except in battle. (Of course we may expect that such laxity will be corrected if we are able to stimulate substantial numbers of rallies, surrenders, or desertions.)

Another opportunity is opened up by the PAVN doctrine on the quality of U.S. (and other Allied) troops under Vietnamese conditions, as reported by the recent ralliers. The PAVN troops were told that the American soldiers were

only "average" in fighting effectiveness as infantry men; that they did not know Vietnamese conditions or terrain; and that they could not fight effectively in the jungle. The Americans, it was said, were not as good as the ARVN. PAVN doctrine conceded that the Americans were superior in armament and their use of helicopters, but characteristically found and stressed a presumed weakness in American fighting capability as a means of maintaining the morale of their troops. Obviously any battlefield evidence of the superior fighting capability of the Americans will be useful in discrediting PAVN doctrine, and the leadership of the PAVN cadres as well. One PAVN unit was said to have been surprised by the capability of the Airborne Cavalry to strike it in the rear. Not having foreseen this, the unit suffered heavy casualties.

Still another opportunity is suggested by a report that the PAVN give better care to the lightly wounded than to the severely wounded. While such practices may be completely justified in terms of the most efficient use of medicine and medics -- especially under battle conditions, including shortages of supplies and specialists -- they have caused shock and dismay, according to ralliers' reports, at the callous neglect of those who might not be made battleworthy in a short time. Ralliers reported that such treatment had sharpened their own fears of death or injury in battle.

PAVN indoctrination of troops in the North usually stresses that they must go south to help end the war soon -- even though the Front has allegedly liberated from 2/3 to 3/4 of the territory, and from 3/4 to 9/10

of the population. When the PAVN soldier arrives in the South he finds that the task is far from finished, that he is faced by large and growing numbers of GVN and U.S. troops, and that he has to accept the high probability of a long war, greater danger of death, and prolonged rupture of family ties. In the South he is told a somewhat different story -- that the Chinese and the Russians will supply equipment and manpower when they are needed, not to gain quick victory but to balance the increasingly powerful forces of the South. The PAVN soldier must then readjust his expectations downward. This is both a challenge to the PAVN control structure, and an opportunity for the GVN propagandist.

The testimony of our PAVN subjects reveals weaknesses in another PAVN indoctrination theme. The indoctrinators allege that the countryside in South Vietnam has already been liberated by the Front, to all intents and purposes; that the remaining duty is to liberate the towns, the cities, and their immediate environs. But the infiltrators quickly notice that much of the countryside is not yet liberated. They have to stay in the jungles or in the mountains and are often told to stay away from the local inhabitants. Moreover, any occupation and pacification of the countryside by the GVN will strike directly at PAVN and Front claims that form an important element in the Communist scenario for victory. Some recent reports on PAVN indoctrination suggest that the Communists may be preparing for a prolonged fight against the towns and cities, despite the optimism of their propaganda. Indoctrinators recollect that the Viet Minh were never able to liberate the cities, which fell only when the

political position of the French was undermined, and a negotiated settlement was arranged at Geneva.

Regroupees provide additional scope for GVN rally propaganda, simply because they have had a chance to compare life under Communism in the North with conditions in the South, and because they have family and other connections with the South. Many or most of the regroupees in our sample were cadres, and seemingly difficult targets for rally propaganda. But several among them, one a former platoon leader, did rally, and thus indicated that this category is by no means proof against GVN appeals.

VIII. PROPAGANDA TACTICS AND PROBLEMS

The foregoing discussion points clearly to some improved propaganda tactics open to the GVN in its efforts to foster rallies, surrenders, and desertions. The simple fact of lack of information in the Front about the Chieu Hoi program points to an inviting gap. That a substantial number of ralliers have come in without even having heard of the program suggests the existence of a large untapped reservoir of potential ralliers, who only await more intensive and better focussed propaganda before making a decision to rally. Moreover, as our informants often mention, the propaganda efforts of the GVN should be sustained, and should be coordinated with GVN actions. The discussion below deals with (a) some propaganda proposals of immediate concern, and (b) longer-run problems, some of them involving the coordination of propaganda with changed policies and operations.

A. IMMEDIATE CONCERNS

In our judgment, Chieu Hoi propaganda should be increasingly focussed during the coming months on the potential waverer in the Front. If the war intensifies, bringing increased dangers and disillusionment to the Front and the PAVN, we can fairly assume that the number of potential waverers will increase. Skillful propaganda can enhance the natural effects of these pressures by pointing to the hopelessness of the VC struggle and to the uselessness of the suffering caused by the VC's obstinate continuation of the fighting. At the same time,

of course, propaganda will stress the prospects for peace, security, national independence, personal freedom, and prosperity under GVN rule, with worldwide assistance from the non-Communist powers.

A sustained U.S. campaign for peace on honorable terms can increase the propensity to waver. But if misunderstanding and distortion are to be avoided, Hanoi and the Front should not be allowed a free field to define the purposes and consequences of America's efforts to bring about such a settlement. It will be more important than ever to define America's aims in fighting on as long as Hanoi and the Viet Cong choose to do so, and to clarify U.S. plans for reconstruction to follow. Meanwhile it is necessary to show the VC waverer the futility of continued resistance.

For present and potential waverers, two lines of propaganda are especially important. One is to increase doubts about Front veracity and the prospects of victory, and to reduce expectations of survival in the VC. The other is information about how to rally or surrender. Propaganda about how to surrender received by the waverer will be equally valuable to others who have decided to surrender and need only to be told where and how. Concurrent propaganda to the waverer, designed to lower his faith in the Front and to increase his fear of death, can erode confidence and reduce the number of those still firmly committed to the Front.

The most urgent propaganda task for the coming months is to demonstrate to the VC waverer that the VC has lost, but that he has an honorable and feasible way out -- now. Events in Vietnam during the latter months of 1965 provide

valuable propaganda materials. For the next few months U.S./GVN propagandists should take advantage of VC assertions that 1965 was the year of decision--the year in which they would either establish the conditions for a general uprising, or take a giant stride forward toward it. Propaganda should sharply remind the VC that 1965 was the year of decision, when the VC made its greatest effort, imposed the greatest sacrifices on the people, and failed. The VC stride forward only provoked the GVN and its allies to greater and more determined efforts, with larger forces and improved weapons, while the VC alienated villagers and forfeited the support it must have to survive. Worse, support from the North now shows uncertainties, as even men from PAVN units and Northern cadres in VC formations have rallied.

GVN/US propaganda should take special pains to tell VC units about the defections of Northerners. As the Northerners are supposed to be the best trained, the most indoctrinated and hard core, any such defections can be especially damaging to VC morale. The VC soldier can well ask himself--if they rally, why not I? Our propaganda should see that the question gets into his mind.

Output should combine evidence of VC/PAVN failures and duplicity to heighten disillusionment and loss of faith in victory.

Another theme that should be heavily stressed is "Death for What?" Propaganda should take advantage of all information about the growing number of deaths and casualties suffered by the Front and ask why the Front continues a futile struggle, denying peace, security, and prosperity to the villager.

Information about U.S. willingness to seek peace on honorable terms should be coupled with news of Hanoi's responses. If Hanoi proves recalcitrant, the opportunity arises to present Hanoi and the Front as cynically forcing their armies to continue risking their lives and suffering hardships for no purpose. If either Hanoi or the Front gives evidence of accepting some sort of negotiations, that opens up opportunities to promote malingering and safety-seeking: Why should Front fighters die in the last weeks of a war? But both of these responses to events are delicate and difficult and it would be more rewarding to emphasize the immediate road of escape from the dangers and hardships of war offered by the Chieu Hoi program. (U.S. output, with due regard for the sensibilities of the GVN, might keep alive the idea that Hanoi is always balancing the prospective gains from negotiations against those from continuation of the armed struggle. As defeats mount, Hanoi could well decide to negotiate secretly, and keep up maximum military pressure--at the cost of lives--until the moment of public capitulation.)

Even if Hanoi and the Front make no favorable response to the peace campaign, knowledge among fighters in the field that such a campaign is continuing can erode morale, reduce operational effectiveness, and contribute to a reevaluation of U.S. purposes in Vietnam.

The middle cadres are an operationally important and increasingly promising target, even if represented so far by only a relatively small number of ralliers and deserters. Since such cadres are sometimes permitted to listen to Saigon radio, or do so anyway, special radio programs should be devised to put pressure on them. The interview

data show that many of the middle cadres have joined the movement and served well in it as a means of personal advancement. The radio programs, therefore, should stress the poor prospects they face if they continue to stay in the Front, and should indicate opportunities for advancement after they have rallied and have proved their loyalty to the GVN. The ideological element in these programs may well be subordinated to considerations of status and material interest. Several of those interviewed were still committed to the ideological goals of the Front, but they nevertheless rallied because of some form of personal humiliation. The GVN can offer the VC soldier an opportunity to help build a free, just, prosperous, and peaceful Vietnam, and, in doing so, take advantage of nationalist aspirations among Front cadres.

The most promising way of increasing the number of ralliers is to appeal to those who have already decided to rally and are only awaiting the needed information and the opportunity to carry out their intention. Next most promising as a target are those whose motivation to rally is present but is still too weak to justify the expected risks and dangers. Instructional leaflets, validated by previous ralliers wherever possible, and authenticated by prominent GVN political authorities, local or national, are needed for both these groups. Instructions about how to rally will help reassure those who are still fearful. The testimony of ralliers and the word of government officials will serve to reassure those still below the threshold of decision and will reinforce the intentions of those awaiting the opportunity to come out. One possible and certainly desirable consequence

of including validation by political authorities is the establishment and reinforcement of the prestige and legitimate authority of the GVN in the eyes of the potential rallier who is still in the Front.

Desires to rally can be strengthened by propaganda directed to the rural population stressing the economic plight of the villager. GVN propaganda should give concrete examples, citing names and places, of villagers who are suffering increasing VC taxes and forced contributions, while breadwinners are away in the Front fighting although fields lie fallow and the older people lack necessities. (GVN propaganda should also address such specific information to fighters in the Front whose families are in distress.) GVN propaganda should encourage the villagers to complain about their plight to members of their families who are away serving in the Front, asking them to rally or to come home. The GVN should also publicize all instances of recovery and pacification of areas formerly controlled by the VC, as well as telling examples of rural construction and of Chieu Hoi successes. Not only ralliers, but refugees should be allowed to tell of their own good experiences and to describe the good things that await future ralliers. Such propaganda should always fix on the VC responsibility for continuing the struggle, and for needless postponement of peace, security, and prosperity.

The villagers themselves, as well as their relatives in the Front, must be made to realize that action to support the VC only postpones peace, but that action weakening the VC, such as rallying or going home, brings nearer the day when families can till their fields and ply their trades together in freedom and security.

A major topic for propaganda to the rural population must continue to be GVN victories and Front defeats. The VC is now living on the propaganda fruits of past victories. Much credible evidence is available to show that the VC have failed to achieve the brilliant victories promised for 1965, have suffered many tactical setbacks, and are forced to exaggerate minor successes and to hide disproportionate losses. A vital task for GVN/US propaganda is to take full advantage of everything the villager himself knows and sees that demonstrates the VC's military weakness, and to fortify this knowledge with news of GVN successes. The villager who is impressed to carry off and bury the Front's dead knows how to evaluate Front claims of minimal casualties and of honorable treatment of those who died in its cause. Such villagers should be encouraged to make their own assessments of Front casualties by pooling information from burial parties, battle witnesses, and others. Exhibits of captured VC weapons and equipment, photographs of VC captives, and photographs of dead abandoned by the VC will give substance to GVN claims. Such exhibits might well be reinforced by providing opportunities for villagers to see well-treated VC captives in prison stockades, and by showing pictures of dead VC being ceremoniously buried by GVN forces. If bodies can be identified, the GVN should make efforts, through radio programs or leaflets, to inform parents and friends in the victims' home areas. By these and other means, the GVN should impress the rural population with the extent of VC defeats, and urge them to persuade members of their families in the VC to "come out" before it is too late.

In these tasks, the GVN/U.S. propagandist enjoys a large and increasing tactical advantage--the growing erosion of the credibility of VC propaganda, and waning trust in the words of the cadres. To rob VC propaganda of its remaining credibility is an ever more feasible and crucial task for the GVN propagandist. Much can be done in the context of Chieu Hoi propaganda, where the VC have created special opportunities for the GVN by circulating falsehoods about the Chieu Hoi program and about GVN treatment of ralliers, deserters, and prisoners.

Another topic for the rural population is news about GVN territorial gains as they are made, and about the progress of rural construction in such areas. The people must be shown how the GVN is reestablishing its control. At the same time, it must be shown that the rural population has a vital interest in that reestablishment. As the facts warrant, stress should be given GVN programs for land reform and other programs for social justice in the countryside. It should be pointed out that those who have been dispossessed by the VC can look forward to restitution. The GVN objective in carrying out such programs, it should be said, is to bring the benefits of peace to the people. Not least among these benefits are simple concrete freedoms--freedom to move without surveillance by the VC; freedom to spend leisure as each person sees fit; freedom from forced labor and "contributions."

A related task is to demonstrate the role of Americans in rural construction by providing VC personnel with authoritative, credible information about the part played by Americans in rebuilding areas where the GVN has re-established its control. Our data offer little hope that mere assertions about the true role of the United States

in Vietnam will do much to offset VC propaganda about the U.S. imperialists. But the data indicate clearly that many persons so propagandized by the VC quickly and easily recast their notions once they have been in contact with Americans, and have had a chance to see for themselves the constructive aspects of American activities. After first-hand experience, the next best thing is the testimony of trusted relatives or friends. Hence the value of fostering direct observation of American construction, medical care, agricultural help, and so on, by villagers, and of urging them to communicate with their relatives still in the Front the truth about what Americans are doing in Vietnam.

While most propaganda to ralliers can best be transmitted via the rural population, some propaganda needs to be sent directly. Among the latter are promises, via leaflets, airborne broadcasts, and radio broadcasts, that the GVN will do everything possible to resettle the family of a rallier, if necessary to their safety, and in any case will assure them help in earning a living or getting family allowances during a resettlement period. These media should also be used to make clear that the GVN will help the family move to a New Life Hamlet, to a district town, or to a similarly secure area, if the relative in the Front comes home. The task is to reassure the potential rallier or deserter that the Government will protect and support his family, and thus deflate one of the major VC-imposed deterrents.

The VC's drive to reduce their administrative personnel and channel the surplus into active VC military service opens up an opportunity for Chieu Hoi propaganda.

A special appeal should be made to VC civilian cadres. It should play on their fears of death and burial without honor, in an unmarked grave far from home. Since civilian cadres are likely to be status-conscious persons, jealous of their position and their prospects in the Front, appeals to them whenever possible should stress telling information about opportunities for position and advancement that may be open to them if they come into the Chieu Hoi program. The contrast between life in the military, for which they have not been trained and for which they have little stomach, and the prospects of safety and a continuation of a political or administrative life will be especially persuasive to these people.

While our data do not yet reveal clearly the effects of efforts to adapt Chieu Hoi policies or propaganda to infiltrators from the North, or to PAVN formations, the data do reveal susceptibilities to such propaganda as well as to straight surrender appeals. During coming months, we should step up efforts to induce surrenders, paralleling them with offers of a choice of integration into life in the South or of returning home to the North. Both straight surrender appeals and instructions, plus arguments about safety and expediency, and Chieu Hoi-type appeals gain force from the Northerners' war weariness, fear of combat, and disillusionment. Men from the North should not be barred from the Chieu Hoi program solely because they may not see it as a return to a former loyalty or as acceptance of the right cause. To close the Chieu Hoi program to North Vietnamese would only flout aspirations to national unity. Although these aspirations are not always strong, they are widespread, and where they are strong, they offer

both a challenge and an opportunity to the GVN to show how they can be achieved under its auspices, with a first step being the creation of a vigorous, viable and free society in the South. Chieu Hoi propaganda in any case will be useful in communicating to the PAVN the purposes and the political and moral strength and legitimacy of the GVN. Such propaganda should stress good treatment by U.S./GVN soldiers, and should take full advantage of the testimony of captives from PAVN units who may be willing to recount their favorable treatment after capture or surrender. The story of good treatment of PAVN soldiers by U.S. troops--and they are more likely to be taken by U.S. troops than by ARVN, under current conditions--could offset the effects of North Vietnamese propaganda about the prevalence of the American imperialist opponent. PAVN troops should be brought to believe that, if they encounter U.S. troops in the field, they face defeat and probable death; but that, if they are captured or surrender, they can count on good treatment.

Some of the most recently interviewed PAVN soldiers have been treated by the GVN as ralliers, after capture by U.S. troops who turned them over to the Government. This mode of entry into the Chieu Hoi program offers some possibilities for promoting surrenders to U.S. forces. Provided there is a good likelihood that the GVN local military or civilian officials will treat favorably-disposed PAVN surrenderers as Chieu Hoi, it might be indicated that the PAVN soldier has a better chance of benefiting from the Chieu Hoi program if he surrenders to Americans, than if he surrenders to ARVN formations. This would have to be done with great care so as not to offend GVN

sensibilities. The message might get through without much risk of embarrassment if stories of the surrender and later treatment of PAVN in Chieu Hoi centers, carried on leaflets or broadcasts, included the point that the surrender had been to an American formation. It is likely that at least some PAVN waverers would draw the correct implication.

Our conclusions about the value of inter-medium reinforcement point to the value of devoting time in GVN radio propaganda to reinforcement of surrender or rally instructions given via leaflets or airborne broadcasts. Our data indicate that there is very widespread listening, both in the Front and in villages under VC control, to reformed opera; ways should be found to interpolate into such programs messages about surrender and rallying that will not expose the hearer to undue reprisals from the VC control apparatus. Periodic mention of names of recent ralliers; news of the establishment of new Chieu Hoi centers; the success stories of ralliers: These and similar items could be worked into radio output.

Time should be devoted on the radio to the political aspects of the struggle--possibly by clever reworking of opera plots. Such programs, and those addressing political messages to cadres or others who can listen with relative safety, should stress the long-term political goals of the GVN. In view of statements of many of our subjects, these program should include concrete examples of desired freedoms that are enjoyed here and now by those who have returned to Saigon's control. The messages should demonstrate respect for the dignity of the individual. Radio is the medium to use in contrasting the regimented order and unrelenting pressures for conformity in thought

and deed, so characteristic of the Front and of Hanoi, with the favorable conditions many Vietnamese experienced in the "quiet years" before the VC rose, and with conditions under the GVN today. The political goal of such programs--the definition of the aims of the GVN, and its offer of a life responsive to genuine Vietnamese values and national aspirations--should be sought where possible through detailed and concrete treatment of situations and events that audiences have had a chance to experience or to observe themselves.

B. LONGER-TERM PROBLEMS

Several problems that are relevant to the immediate future may take some time to solve because of their relationship to needed changes in GVN policies or operations. These unresolved problems tend to limit the success of Chieu Hoi propaganda and to reduce the rate of rallying and surrendering.

The interview data strongly suggest that the GVN, in its surrender propaganda, has not successfully differentiated classes among its target audiences--classes such as regroupees, infiltrators, and cadres of South Vietnamese origin; production workers, transportation workers, and other rear service elements; new recruits or veteran fighters; military or civilian propagandists or administrative personnel, and so forth. Such differentiations may be difficult for front-line propaganda, but can be effectively made in special radio programs, or in portions of programs designed for the particular situations and concerns of major target groups. By addressing specialized

propaganda to clearly distinguished groups--including military units on the battlefield for which adequate order-of-battle information is available--surrender propaganda can gain precision and strength.

The data suggest further that propaganda can more successfully exploit local issues, events, and opportunities. Field propaganda units should take full advantage of local media, information, and personnel to make detailed and personalized propaganda, specialized in time and place.

Although our data show clearly that effective use has been made of communications to families, and through them to potential ralliers, to stimulate desertion or rallying, more intensive efforts are in order to bring precise and favorable information about the Chieu Hoi program to the attention of families of potential ralliers and of other villagers who are in a position to reinforce the credibility and persuasiveness of such messages. It is especially important to invite villagers in VC or VC-contested areas to visit well-running Chieu Hoi centers.

Our data also indicate that refugees are not being effectively used as channels for Chieu Hoi messages. GVN/U.S. propaganda should invite refugees where possible to visit Chieu Hoi centers, and should take advantage in other ways of the fact that many refugees do circulate between GVN, contested, or VC areas, or that refugees have family connections in contested or VC areas that can be used to transmit GVN/U.S. messages to VC personnel.

A few of our informants have pointed to the inadequacy or inefficacy of the political reeducation materials used in the Chieu Hoi program. Reeducation obviously should be of first quality and should be carried out

primarily by Vietnamese in order to give it full authenticity and credibility. But U.S. personnel associated with Chieu Hoi and personnel of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) should help where possible so as to ensure accuracy in the presentation of materials dealing with American policies and programs. The process of political reeducation offers an invaluable opportunity to refashion the U.S. image in the minds of the Vietnamese, and to communicate the refashioned image credibly and authoritatively through the mouths of those who have rallied and have undergone retraining. Some of the ralliers who may have a special talent for propaganda work should be exposed to visual demonstrations of U.S. efforts at reconstruction and progress for the Vietnamese, and then enabled to tell the story to those still in the Front.

Neglected media of communication in Vietnam for the purposes of the Chieu Hoi program are the book and the extended political pamphlet. Possibly some of the energy of the urban elites of South Vietnam might be directed to a full-scale examination of the political struggle, and to the elaboration of a program for political reeducation compatible with the military, political, and economic activities of the GVN.

The interviews revealed confusion over the status of the prisoner who tries to rally on the battlefield, but is arbitrarily deprived of rallier status because of the place and time of his surrender. This confusion contributes to reluctance to rally and may also contribute to reluctance to surrender. It may be impossible to get the GVN to change this practice so as systematically to permit rallying on the battlefield. But it might be possible to

establish rules for the more lenient treatment of persons who surrender on the battlefield without a struggle, or who have brought in weapons or valuable intelligence. Examples of leniency in these circumstances should then be advertised.

Improvements like those just suggested should be especially important with respect to PAVN troops and many Main Force elements, since these soldiers rarely have the knowledge of terrain and GVN organization that make it possible for them to rally instead of merely surrendering.

Another innovation would be to make it possible for prisoners to shift their status from prisoner to rallier after they had demonstrated renewed loyalty to the GVN. Much of the British success in reducing insurgency in Malaya turned on a scheme for classifying prisoners as cooperative or stubborn: Each prisoner could classify himself by his own behavior; the stubborn were treated with the utmost severity; the cooperative had to prove their loyalty by concrete assistance to the government.

Throughout these recommendations for improvement in communications about Chieu Hoi there runs a hitherto unstated assumption: that the administration of the Chieu Hoi program is going to maintain a level of performance that will impress the Vietnamese favorably. This level of performance will be well below what would impress the average American. But the imposition of excessively high standards by American advisers would be counterproductive in the short run. The consequent frictions and failures would impede needed long-run development. Even adopting the lower criterion, it is apparent that performance can be considerably improved. Reasonable and timely

suggestions for improvement have been made in the Goshō Report, issued August 10, 1965, and cited in full at p. 11, above.

Prominent among the Goshō Report's recommendations for improved administration that are relevant to the stimulation of additional ralliers were these: (1) placement of the Chieu Hoi organization directly under the Office of the Prime Minister, with a Director of sufficient rank and status to facilitate coordination with the Ministers of the Government of Vietnam; (2) increased U.S. assistance, particularly in the form of advice, for the Chieu Hoi program; (3) establishment of five Regional Centers each able to care for 400 persons, and continuance of the good Province Centers able to deal with at least 400 ralliers; (4) establishment of a systematic "post-resettlement" inspection system to look into the welfare of released returnees, to deter redefection, and to take necessary action where redefection has occurred; and (5) provision of a more flexible and adequate budget. The report also recommended changes in the definition of a rallier to permit rallying on the battlefield, and to allow surrenderers and prisoners of war to qualify for the program by appropriate conduct or other concrete proofs of a change of heart. Finally, the report recommended that the Chieu Hoi ralliers provide facts and themes for propaganda, but that propaganda operations be carried out by the appropriate operating wings of the Psychological Warfare Ministry.

Our field observations indicate that a recurring difficulty in the financing of Chieu Hoi field operations has been the slow and complex process of getting funds down to local authorities, and sometimes the unwillingness of local authorities to spend funds when they do arrive. Hopefully these weaknesses will be overcome. Meanwhile, consideration might be given to providing local USAID officials with supplementary funds to be spent for spot help where needed, perhaps to reward ralliers for weapons brought in to provide emergency assistance for the rallier or his family, or for similar purposes.

It remains fundamentally important that Chieu Hoi communications transmit only reasonable promises relating to the treatment of ralliers. Messages concerning reception, classification, training, jobs, and political reintegration should not hold out false hopes. Commitments made should be scrupulously respected. Informal but influential channels of communication work quickly and devastatingly to carry information about any shortcomings. Particularly damaging are such practices as treating ralliers like prisoners; using harsh methods of military interrogation; and mixing ralliers and prisoners in the same facilities at military centers. Resentment spreads rapidly when it is learned that VC have tried to rally but have been classified by the GVN as prisoners because of the circumstances of their attempts to do so, or because of the decisions of lower echelon captors concerning the sincerity of the would-be rallier. Trouble arises, too, when a subject correctly classified as a rallier is treated as a prisoner after his rally and initial processing. Quy Chanh have been sent to military

installations and subjected to military-type interrogation with little regard for them as persons and none for the effect such treatment has on the attractiveness of the Chieu Hoi program or on the credibility of its promises.

During the course of our work in Saigon, in discussion with both U.S. and Vietnamese officials, some problems and difficulties emerged that are worth mentioning even though they were not explicitly mentioned in the interviews. In the past the program has suffered from organizational instability and wavering support from the Government of Vietnam, and from difficulties engendered by the level and nature of the policy support, the part-time program support, and the hitherto modest material assistance given the program by the United States. Although such considerations are not mentioned by our informants, they nevertheless affect the stature, the competence, and the viability of the program, and thus affect the testimony concerning the program relayed to the potential rallier by family, friends, or former comrades in arms. Were the program as a whole to receive better support from both the GVN and the United States, public information about it doubtless would be more persuasive.

Other problems are revealed by our subjects. One set of them centers upon ralliers' expectations of employment in government. Those interviewed sometimes expressed disappointment over unfulfilled hopes, though on occasion these hopes were extravagant. Some demanded careers or opportunities equivalent to what they had given up in rallying. Such demands raise more problems for the GVN and its policies than for Chieu Hoi. The more realistic ambitions can be and are being satisfied.

For example, there are openings in the ARVN and in the ranks of specially qualified propagandists. Requests for jobs as administrators or advisers in the Chieu Hoi organization or in other GVN agencies can rarely be met in the short run, and certainly not before the rallier has proved his change of heart and demonstrated his capabilities. The important point is that strong efforts should be made to assure opportunities for professional service and career advancement to those who return to the government's side, and to advertise these opportunities among Front cadres.

IX. CONCLUDING COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS

The Chieu Hoi program to date presents small accomplishments but great potentiality. The number of ralliers remains small despite gains in the last months of 1965, and most are lower cadres or rank and file. Little if any penetration has been made into the VC structure above the lower cadres.

Yet the opportunities for a successful program to stimulate rallies from the VC have improved. The deployment of U.S. military power has indicated a continuing political resolve. The combat record of the VC during the months of the 1965 monsoon contributed little to the conditions for a "general uprising," despite growth in overall VC manpower under arms and a continuation of "incidents." Meanwhile the hardships and danger of life in the VC have increased; the brutality of recruitment methods has worsened; the Front has increased its manpower under arms at the cost of quality and dependability. In many units morale seems to have declined. The prospect of a VC victory has dimmed. Even the cadres admit that "the day of the general uprising" has been postponed again. Hopes of victory are increasingly related to the possibility of a failure in U.S. political resolve.

The experience of many villagers, both citizens and soldiers, under VC control has demonstrated wide differences between expectations and reality. Rightly or wrongly both civilians and soldiers use present experience as a criterion of the quality of life that might be expected if the VC were to win. It is certain

that the VC villager and soldier know well what life is going to be like if the VC continue the struggle. The political environment within which the GVN fights has improved. The government has launched its own programs of reform. Our informants report that the behavior of GVN troops, on the battlefield and off, has markedly improved. Recollections of the petty tyrannies and corruption experienced under the Diem regime are fading into the past. The VC soldier's faith in the Front's promises and in the integrity of the cadres is being eroded by duplicity and disappointments. Many villagers also are losing faith.

The value of peace to the Vietnamese farmer and Front soldier is higher than ever. The road to peace via a GVN victory looks more open and inviting as the GVN and the United States deploy greater military strength and push forward with rural construction. During 1965 the VC have markedly increased their forces, building up their Main Force and Local Force units. More troops from North Vietnam were committed, and more may be on the way. Recent battles in the highlands have been fought against stubborn, well trained troops, who were ready to accept disproportionate losses. Some VC and PAVN performances elsewhere also attest to high morale in some units. But there are many points where vigorous propaganda combined with military efforts can yield impressive results in rallies, surrenders, and desertions. These points are by no means confined to the areas where we have indications of low VC morale; they may well include the very areas where the VC has performed stubbornly and brilliantly, but has

suffered severe losses. Many interviews revealed the shock to morale of such defeats; there is no reason to believe that VC or PAVN battalions that have fought well but have been badly mauled are exempt from these shocks. We can be sure, of course, that the VC will make major efforts to repair their morale. It is therefore vital to bring home to them the extent of their defeat and the futility of their sacrifices.

As the military aspect of the struggle improves, the political aspect becomes more important, as a major means of hastening military triumph, and the only means of consolidating it. To these purposes the Chieu Hoi program can make major contributions. A successful Chieu Hoi program can cut into the VC's pool of manpower by inducing desertion and surrender as well as rallies, and by reducing the effectiveness of many VC soldiers and recruits. It can increase the flow of prompt and dependable military intelligence, not only by bringing in ralliers, but also by helping to convince villagers of the rightness and the probable victory of the GVN, and thus increasing their willingness to give timely information.

Chieu Hoi can confer valuable political benefits on both the GVN and the United States. A successful program can demonstrate to the Vietnamese that the GVN is capable of practicing social and economic justice while it strives to meet the major legitimate political aspirations of the Vietnamese people. One major aspiration is shared by the VC and the GVN: the achievement of national independence, i.e., the successful conclusion of the anti-colonialist

struggle. The leaders of both promise an economically viable, socially balanced, and politically just nation. The interview data confirm the acceptance of these goals throughout South Vietnam. Critical differences arise, however, over the different ways in which the two sides attempt to realize these goals in practice. The GVN seeks national liberation from Communist domination, whether externally or internally imposed, while the Front promises an independent Vietnam ostensibly exempt from subservience to China or the Soviet Union. The GVN, with or without a Chieu Hoi program, cannot exploit the presence of a foreign element on the opposing side, as Hanoi and the Front do, to activate Vietnamese xenophobia and win support for "chasing out the imperialists." But the GVN can take advantage of solid American support for a program of national construction, and it can help to assure its people that the Americans, far from being "imperialist," are a valuable ally and friend, capable of hastening both economic reconstruction and the kind of political institution building that is compatible with freedom. The benefits of U.S.-Vietnamese collaboration can be brought home in specific and concrete form to the people under Saigon's control. United States participation in and support for a successful and viable Chieu Hoi program can help demonstrate that American long-run objectives in Vietnam are not to weaken or disunite the country, not to wreak destruction, not to establish bases for military operations, but to create opportunities for building a free nation.

At the beginning of this section, we noted the disappointing numbers and low rank of the ralliers. But

these factors do not indicate the full value of the program. By its very existence and modest success, the Chieu Hoi program exercises continuous erosive pressure on the Viet Cong, both politically and militarily. This it does both directly, by stimulating rallies, and indirectly, by stimulating desertions. At the same time, the program helps to legitimize the political aims and behavior of both the GVN and the United States in the eyes of the individual Vietnamese.

The program, and knowledge of it, may decisively affect the behavior of VC who are considering rallying because they are not wholly committed to service with the Front. It puts additional strain on the control systems of the VC, whose precautions may sometimes draw more attention to GVN leaflets and broadcasts than they would otherwise have attracted. Chieu Hoi activities trap VC cadres into lies and deceptions, sometimes penetrated by the good sense of the VC soldier, sometimes exposed by the observations and experience of the soldier or his friends. Finally, the program provides a concrete demonstration of the concern of the GVN to find ways of reintegrating former VC personnel into the national community.

By joint participation in the Chieu Hoi program, the United States and the GVN can define the U.S. presence in Vietnam far more credibly and tellingly than by verbal denials of American "imperialist" intentions, or by mere assertions of America's good intentions.

Despite these proved benefits and prospective opportunities, the program has not always enjoyed full and sustained support. Funds and other resources allocated for Chieu Hoi programs have not always been made available

promptly and used to the full. A clear opportunity exists for both governments, by investing modest additional resources, especially in skilled manpower, and by assuring firm and continuing support, to make more than proportionate military and political gains.

APPENDIX A

The interviews with Viet Cong defectors, on which this analysis is based, took place during the 11-month period from December 1964 through November 1965. Though the length of time between rally and interview varied from one or two days for a few subjects, to over three years for one interviewee, the majority of subjects were interviewed one to four months after rallying.

Of the 151 subjects interviewed whom we have classed as ralliers, 147 rallied to the GVN under the Chieu Hoi program, three surrendered with plausible stories of deliberately turning themselves in, and one North Vietnamese farmer claimed he swam the Ben Hai River at the 17th parallel. Classified according to the last unit in which they served, 56 of the military interviewees defected from Main Force units, 34 from Local Force units, and 32 from village or hamlet guerrilla units. Twenty-seven of the interviewees were civilians and, except for the North Vietnamese farmer, had worked actively with the Front from the provincial level downward. Two were new recruits. Table 1 (p. 7) presents the number of rallies in the RAND sample by month and major category.

The length of time the subject had served with the Viet Cong varied widely. Two had been active since the Geneva Conference of 1954. Seven had been active for only a month or less prior to leaving their units, and five North Vietnamese had rallied before reaching their units in the South. However, approximately 40 percent had been active in the Front from one to four years, so

that the data include the views of many persons with substantial experience in the VC.

Our informants ranged in age from 15 to 40. Over two-thirds of them were between 17 and 30; a little over one-half were in their twenties. Except for the civilians, there was no conspicuous age-group concentration either for unit served (Main Force, Local Force, or guerrillas) or for date of rally. The civilian interviewees, as a class, tended to be older.

Forty-one of the interviewees were military cadres: 19 Main Force, 14 Local Force, and 8 guerrillas. Fourteen of the subjects were civilian cadres. The highest ranking subjects were a Main Force Company Commander, 2 Main Force Assistant Company Commanders, 4 platoon leaders, and 4 assistant platoon leaders. The majority of the other cadre interviewees were squad leaders. All the cadres except 12 had served one year or more with the Viet Cong; 2 had completed five or more years of active duty.

The subjects' former operational areas included 30 of the provinces in South Vietnam. Defectors from Main Force units (which may operate in one or more provinces) came from units operating in 19 provinces; 3 men had been in I Corps area; 4 in II Corps, 5 in III Corps, and 7 in IV Corps.

The majority of the interviewees rallied directly from their units. However, a sizable number, 25 per cent of the sample, deserted from their units and returned home before rallying. Seventeen of these deserter-ralliers came from Main Force units, 9 from Local Force

units, and 8 from village guerrilla units. Ten deserters (six Main Force, one Local Force, two village guerrillas) went to contested hamlets. The reported lengths of time between desertion and rally range from one day to seven months. (Not all the subjects in the sample were asked how long they stayed in their hamlets after leaving their units, so it is impossible to determine an average length of time between desertion and rally for all subjects.) The data suggest that a sizable number of Viet Cong have deserted and returned home but have not rallied.

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APPENDIX B

VC RESPONSES TO THE CHIEU HOI PROGRAM

This appendix reproduces the text of two documents issued by the VC in Dinh Tuong Province in the fall of 1965. These documents bear on VC activities to counter GVN efforts to induce VC personnel to surrender or desert to the GVN. The first was reserved by the VC for direct distribution to Party Chapters. Appearing on November 5, 1965, it dealt with "the enemy's psychological warfare (Chieu Hoi) activities." The other, given by an agent to the GVN authorities in Dinh Tuong Province on January 13, 1966, outlined a full-scale campaign against "deserters, surrenderers and traitors in the army." This too was a "document for discussion," but apparently was not as limited in circulation as the first.

It is noteworthy that the second document refers to the GVN program to induce defection not as the Chieu Hoi, but as a "Chieu An" program. The best translation of Chieu An is "appeal for peace," a phrase superficially not much different from Chieu Hoi, or "open arms." But the significance of the change, for VC counterpropaganda, arises from the fact that the French tried to launch a defector program entitled Chieu An, and the VC obviously regard it as important to link the current Chieu Hoi program to its ineffective and imperialist-oriented predecessor. It should be said, however, that there has been no mention of this link in any of our interviews.

The two documents presented below are notable for admissions by the VC of the effectiveness of the Chieu

Hoi program not only as a source of intelligence about the VC not available elsewhere, but as a source of powerful propaganda and other embarrassments at a time of "temporary hardships" for the VC. They are also notable for their clear grasp of the nature and strategy of the Chieu Hoi program. They refer to specific instances of GVN success in bringing about surrenders, desertions, and defections. They indicate the VC's awareness that the GVN has stepped up its efforts to promote defections and desertions.

An interesting nuance occurs in the statement that "one does not always defect in order to betray the country." Another appears in the judgment that "once a man makes up his mind to surrender to the enemy and to betray his fatherland, he becomes an enemy of the Revolution and of the armed forces." Since desertion or surrender may obviously be contemplated long before any action is taken, the VC appear to regard the potential rallier as a traitor in their midst.

The documents emphasize preventive action by the VC. They recognize that surrender or defection may be provoked by some minor injustice that has gone unrecognized and uncorrected. They also recognize that a traitor to the VC can easily become a loyal adherent of the GVN.

THE DINH TUONG PROVINCE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

NOTICE

On the enemy's psychological warfare
(Chieu Hoi) activities

In the past months, the enemy has strongly pushed ahead their psychological warfare (Chieu Hoi) activities. They used loudspeakers mounted on aircraft to make broadcasts in our base areas and in regions bordering on our base areas. They made false propaganda to deceive the people and invented news of their victories and of our defeats. They had the treacherous defectors write letters and leaflets calling on the fighters and cadres who were still in our ranks to surrender. They used airplanes to drop these leaflets in our base areas and in regions bordering on our base areas. In the regions near the areas under their control, they had the security police and spies disseminate these leaflets. On the one hand they used the leaflets to make propaganda, and on the other hand they disseminated safe-conducts so that any of our fighters and cadres who wanted to surrender could go anywhere to rally.

They bombed and shelled our base areas and the regions bordering on our base areas heavily. Following the bombings and shellings the security police and spies came in to carry out sabotage activities -- such as stealing and robbing, spreading false news, telling the people that the GVN had shelled and bombed this and that area, and that such and such Front cadres and fighters who had gone on missions far away had been arrested or killed -- in

order to sow confusion among the people and bring them to move to GVN-controlled areas. They looked for the families with members in the Resistance in order to buy them off and force them to call on their sons or husbands to surrender.

These psychological warfare (Chieu Hoi) activities of the enemy have affected the morale of the people and of our armed forces (especially the guerrillas). This was most clearly evidenced by the defection of cadres and fighters from our armed forces (especially the guerrillas). However, we have not been able to determine how many of these cases of defection were due to the influence of the enemy's psychological warfare activities. The most outstanding case was a unit that suffered 47 desertions and 2 defections within a month. In one district, 4 guerrillas surrendered to the enemy within a month. Judging from individual cases of desertion from some units, we could see that the influence of the enemy's Chieu Hoi policy on the people and our armed forces was rather great.

Recently, the enemy have adopted bolder and craftier psychological warfare (Chieu Hoi) methods. They began to force families with members in the resistance and living in insecure areas or in Strategic Hamlets to study the Chieu Hoi program. In Cho Gao District, they forced 25 families with members in the resistance to study their Chieu Hoi program. In some areas outside the province the enemy employed the same method. This study session lasted for 15 days. The contents of the course included false propaganda on their victories and our defeats, and propaganda on the weapons, heavy equipment, and aircraft

of the Americans, and on the intensity of the war. At the end of the course, they forced each family to sign a letter of guarantee stating that they would call on their sons or husbands to surrender or to return home to work. If these families could not appeal to their sons or husbands, they had to reveal the location of their sons' or husbands' units or agencies. The families who succeeded in making their sons or husbands leave the ranks of the resistance were rewarded. Those who failed were imprisoned on the basis of their letters of guarantee. During the study session each person had to stand up and denounce the Communists.

Through these activities, the enemy obtained some results and caused us a number of difficulties. Following these study courses, a number of families called on their members to leave the ranks of the resistance. In Tan Thuan Binh, 4 families appealed to 4 guerrillas to surrender to the enemy. In Tan My Chanh 1 guerrilla surrendered to the enemy. In Xuan Dong, 1 party member surrendered to the enemy, and in Binh Phan a guerrilla surrendered to the enemy.

In one district alone, in the first campaign launched by the enemy, 25 families attended the course. At the end of the session, 7 of them called on their members to surrender to the enemy. From the point of view of psychological warfare, the enemy's Chieu Hoi policy caused us many more difficulties. For this reason, we should understand thoroughly the cunning new methods and plans of the enemy in order to oppose them.

To foil the enemy's crafty psychological warfare plots, the My Tho Province Military Affairs Committee has

set up a few guidelines for the command staffs and Party Committees. On the basis of these guidelines and of the situation in each unit and each area, the command staffs and Party Committees should devise concrete measures to cope with the situation. These guidelines are:

1. The Party Committees and the Command Staff of every unit must understand well the plots and plans of the enemy in the fields of psychological warfare in order to educate and point out to the cadres and fighters the schemes of the enemy, and to put them on the alert against these schemes.

2. Increase control over the thoughts of the unit members. The Party Committees and the Command Staffs must know of every ideological evolution in each individual in order to educate him in time, and guide him in overcoming all pessimistic factors that are favorable to the enemy's Chieu Hoi activities. Maintain and increase the system of daily general discussions of the three-man cells, of the squads and platoons.

3. Every local unit must control cadres' and fighters' families living in Strategic Hamlets or in the enemy's strategic areas in order to devise plans for ideological guidance and indoctrination of these families.

4. Adoption of a system whereby the cadres and fighters themselves indoctrinate their families and strengthen the ideological standpoint of the latter. At the same time they have to report all contacts between their families or friends and the units or agencies in which they serve. Each time a cadre or fighter receives a visit by his family or friends, he has to report his

family's ideological evolution to the units or agencies so that the latter can educate and help them.

5. The Party Committees and the Command Staffs must educate the fighters and cadres frequently on the crafty schemes of the enemy in the field of psychological warfare activities so that the latter can go around making propaganda and can motivate the people to oppose all the cunning schemes of the enemy.

These are a few ideas that have been put forth to enable organizations everywhere to devise appropriate measures to cope with the enemy's activities, on the basis of the situation in their own areas or units. Agencies everywhere must keep a close watch on the plans and activities of the enemy in the field of psychological warfare and report them to the Military Affairs Committee so that the latter can warn organizations everywhere and enable them to devise countermeasures in time.

THE MY THO PROVINCE MILITARY AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

This notice should be read for discussion within the Party Chapters only. The cadres should base their talks to the fighters on the contents of the notice in order to educate them and make them hate the enemy's schemes. At the same time, the cadres, in order to consolidate their units, should show their contempt for those who betray the people.

This notice should not be read to the fighters. The cadres should not let themselves be demoralized, and at the same time they should not decide incorrectly that their units are not influenced by Chieu Hoi appeals.

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Report immediately to the K6 Military Affairs Committee
upon completion of study.

December 4, 1965
K6 Military Affairs Committee

THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST DESERTERS, SURRENDERERS,
AND TRAITORS IN THE ARMY

Contents

- I. Definition
- II. Duties of the defense mission in the campaign against deserters, surrenderers, and traitors to the fatherland
- III. Characteristics of those who have the intention to desert, surrender, or betray the fatherland
- IV. A number of measures that must be applied in the campaign against deserters, surrenderers, and traitors to the fatherland
- V. Conclusions

I. Definition

Those who betray the oath of loyalty to the army and to the country by leaving the revolutionary ranks to join the enemy against the army, the people, and the country are deserters, surrenderers, or traitors to the fatherland.

In time of war or of peace, there sometimes are defectors from the armed forces. This event [defection] rarely happens in time of war. And one does not always defect in order to betray the country. But no matter how rare it is, it is not less dangerous to us, because the defectors can supply our enemy with precious military secrets that the latter could never get hold of otherwise. The defectors are [among] those whom we have trained and educated, and to whom we have entrusted various missions.

Some of them were in a position of leadership and have been active in our ranks. Therefore they possess accurate information about our military secrets and about the methods of operation of our revolutionary army, as well as our organizations, activities, operations, locations of storehouses, and organizations that are the nerve centers of the revolution.

Of course, knowledge of military secrets is broad or narrow, shallow or deep, depending on the situation of the unit to which each traitor belonged. But, generally speaking, defectors are able to supply the enemy with accurate and valuable information that the latter can use to strike against us and cause us great damage if it is applied in time. Even in the long run, [such information] will be immensely harmful to our army.

The enemy will seize the chance to exploit information from defectors and will have them spot our positions or use them effectively in the counterrevolutionary campaign. Sometimes the defectors are used as a means for making propaganda against us, and to urge our weak and backward members to follow in their treacherous footsteps. In other words, the enemy will try to proselytize our cadres and fighters so as to induce them to join the enemy any time, any place, by using propaganda to heighten the dissatisfaction of our men.

At present they are taking advantage of our temporary hardships to make propaganda for their "Chieu An" program. For some time, this particular activity of the enemy has brought us a lot of difficulties and great losses. Therefore the task of fighting defection, surrender, and

betrayal of the country is one of the most important matters in the defense of the armed forces and of the Revolution.

II. Duties of the defense mission in the campaign against deserters, defectors, and traitors

The reasons for defection are:

- shirking, fear of death or of hardships
- dissatisfaction with the leadership or with the policy of the party, or with the policy of the armed forces
- being proselytized, sweet-talked by the enemy
- the defectors were enemy agents who had infiltrated our ranks

But whatever the reason is, once a man makes up his mind to surrender to the enemy and to betray his fatherland he becomes the enemy of the Revolution and of the armed forces. Thus, he becomes the most dangerous target for our defense mission.

The task of fighting against deserters, defectors, and traitors is the responsibility of the whole party and of the entire population; at the same time it is one of the duties of the defense mission. The duties of the defense mission are:

1. Keeping constant watch in order to detect situations and symptoms that might lead to defection and betrayal of the fatherland, and reporting to the leaders so that the latter can devise effective preventive measures;

2. If there is a sudden defection within the unit

or agency, applying at once all necessary measures in order to help the Party Committee and the unit leaders find a method to avoid and limit the damage that might be inflicted on the unit or agency by the traitor;

3. Assuming responsibility for gathering data and keeping a dossier on the traitors to the fatherland in order to facilitate our protection now and in the future.

The duty of the defense mission is to prevent defections and not to wait till things happen to devise measures to cope with the situation. If the defense mission lets defections take place it will be difficult for us to devise countermeasures in time. Even if we succeed in limiting the damage, we shall lose our prestige and the reputation of the revolutionary army will be tarnished.

III. Characteristics of those who have the intention to desert, surrender, or betray the fatherland

In order to be successful in the above-mentioned mission we have to pay attention to the characteristics of the individuals who have the intention to defect and to the circumstances that might lead to defection and betrayal of the fatherland. On this basis, we can devise effective preventive measures.

1. Characteristics:

a) Before defecting, an individual must go through a period of preparation that may be short or long, depending on the situation of the unit or of the agency in which he serves. But at least he must go through a brief ideological struggle.

b) Those who intend to defect and betray the fatherland are usually very discreet and secretive before they defect. They think of all sorts of schemes to oppose us in our efforts to surround and detect them.

c) Generally speaking, they are those who are afraid of death and shirk their duties. Before they join the enemy's ranks, they must try to win the confidence of the enemy in order to ensure their survival and good treatment by the enemy.

d) If disloyalty evolves from a conflict within the individual and takes the form of defection to the enemy's ranks and armed opposition to us, the defection may happen suddenly. In the case of an individual who is in conflict with his comrades and then turns around and joins the enemy to oppose us actively, the change is very complex and delicate. Sometimes the change is so sudden that he can be in the front line of the enemy within seconds to fight against the people, even though he may have a record of revolutionary activities, or have gone through all sorts of tests after being well trained and indoctrinated.

Some men may follow the wrong path because they are dissatisfied over an unimportant matter. Such dissatisfaction may push a man along the wrong path if his disaffection goes unnoticed, if we are too optimistic, or if we are not watchful.

e) Once they have defected and betrayed the fatherland they are completely changed. They lose all conscience and commit bloody crimes against the people and the revolution in order to lead a selfish life. Generally speaking, they will become loyal henchmen of the enemy.

Some may continue effectively to sabotage our efforts for a long time, even after the revolution achieves success.

2. Common characteristics of those who intend to defect and betray the fatherland:

Usually, before defecting:

- a) they try to hold of secret information, read or steal or hide secret documents, copy secret documents that are not in their area of responsibility in order to report and render service to the enemy;
- b) they steal and hide authorization papers or forge these papers in order to pass through our control stations, and they deceive the people, so as to escape and join the enemy;
- c) they steal and hide weapons and important documents, and keep enemy leaflets and safe conducts for identification purposes when they surrender;
- d) they ask questions about the enemy's treatment of defectors in order to find out more about it; they try to find out about the situation and life in enemy areas, and about the routes between our areas and the enemy-controlled areas, in order to prepare for their defection;
- e) before defecting they usually pretend to be enthusiastic, and to do their utmost, in order to deceive us and put us off guard; they volunteer to go on missions by themselves far from their unit or agency, or in regions near the enemy-controlled areas, to prepare for their defection;
- f) the characteristics of those who intend to defect also depend on their psychology, their personality,

their social class, their mission within our ranks, and their situation; if they are high ranking cadres, they usually are more discreet and subtle than the fighters;

g) if the men who intend to defect operate deep in our base areas, they are not familiar with the routes between the areas under our control and those under the enemy control. Usually they have to have a longer period of preparation than those who operate near the enemy-controlled areas and are familiar with the different routes...;

h) those who operate deep in the enemy-controlled areas -- like the armed propaganda teams -- will act swiftly and it will be difficult for us to cope with them in time. If we have not been careful in keeping watch over them before, and if we have lost our good judgment so far as to entrust them with missions in enemy-controlled areas, then we ourselves have created the conditions that facilitate their defection;

i) those who intend to defect usually try to look for ways to detach themselves from a column on the march or to lag behind the column in order to run away;

j) during combat those who intend to defect, so as not to be shot at by mistake, will prepare secret signals with the enemy in order to join their ranks -- signals such as a piece of white cloth or a white handkerchief tied to their rifles; or they volunteer to walk in the front line in order to escape and report our battle plan to the enemy. Or during combat they take advantage of the exchange of fire to kill the comrades next to them, get hold of his rifle, and run to join the ranks of the enemy; or they look for excuses to

stay behind when we withdraw after the battle or operation;

k) those who commit errors suddenly and are afraid of our punishment, or who are disaffected by loss of face caused by our punishment and want to defect, usually show their ideological struggle by leaving letters behind for their close friends;

1) when elements planted by the enemy in our ranks have completed their mission or when they see that the situation has become unfavorable to them (even though their mission is unfinished), they usually try to desert; before returning to the enemy's ranks, they usually carry out sabotage activities and try to motivate others to desert with them and to bring along some weapons.

3. Circumstances that usually lead to defection:

a) where and when the men have to go through too many emotional and material hardships and privations;

b) when the revolutionary movement encounters difficulty temporarily, when the war situation becomes dangerous, when the enemy surrounds and terrorizes us, or when they increase their big-sweep operations;

c) during fierce battles in which the enemy is stronger than we, and we suffer heavy casualties or are defeated;

d) when those in positions of leadership do not apply to the fullest the policy of the revolution, especially with regard to the relations between cadres and fighters...;

e) whenever and wherever we do not keep close watch over the men, when we maintain loose control over our ranks, when our political activities are not pushed ahead enough to strengthen the ideological standpoint of the

men, or when we are over-optimistic -- and the enemy intensifies his psychological warfare to demoralize and appeal to our cadres and fighters....

IV. Measures to combat the enemy's psy war.

1. Conduct study courses to raise [our people's] patriotism, their loyalty to the Army and the country, and to raise the people's level of revolutionary enlightenment so as to be able to fight back against the enemy psy war actions. This is one of the most basic measures and should be carried out continuously for a long time to come. If it is carried out accordingly, it will give us an advantage over the enemy in that we can take the initiative to prevent defections.

Not only should [our men] be told about the enemy's deviousness and counterpropaganda, but their absolute loyalty to the Army, the country, and the people should also be promoted. Each soldier has the duty to defend the traditional honor of the Revolutionary Army. The ten oaths of the Revolutionary Army should always be repeated.

The revelation of the enemy's "Chieu An" policy, and of examples of men who have defected and surrendered to the enemy and have betrayed the country, should depend on the situation and on the objective in view. This effort should have limits. Be careful not to encourage the bad elements. If such incidents happen in any organization or unit, that organization or unit should mobilize the people's hatred against the betrayals. The people should be told about the defectors' reasons and

devious tactics so that they can watch out for themselves.

The Party Chapter Committee, unit commanders, and cadres directly in charge of the political missions are responsible for education in this matter. The protective organizations are responsible for reconnoitering each area at a certain time so they can help the Party Chapter Committee and the unit commanders determine the contents of the study courses.

Leaders should give more attention to the elimination of bureaucracy, show more concern over the difficulties in the fighters' lives, and curb the arrogant, militarist, and undemocratic behavior of the commanding cadres. [They should] encourage the expansion of democracy, self-criticism, and criticism so they can solve internal conflicts in time and prevent those conflicts from turning into opposing views that could lead to defection and betrayal of the country.

2. Strict control over the political views and thoughts of the members:

a) Carry out the internal political survey missions daily. Do not let even one small suspicious indication pass. Pay special attention to the [expression of] viewpoints that might lead to betrayal of the country. While the surveys are being carried out, pay special attention to individual and general indications of defections and at the same time watch out for the following:

- o New recruits usually behave badly, reacting to the material and emotional hardships [of life] in the Army.

- o [Watch] soldiers who return after a long period of absence.
- o [Watch] shirkers, those who are afraid of getting killed and long for life in the enemy's areas.
- o [Watch] soldiers who are defectors from the enemy's ranks.
- o [Watch] those who get permission to visit their families and refuse to return to their units even though they have received orders from the high echelons.
- o [Watch] people who befriend those who have permission to go back and forth between our and the enemy's areas -- although it isn't in their sphere of action.
- o [Watch] those who volunteer for missions in the enemy's areas without being asked.
- o [Watch] those whose behavior changes abruptly; for example, the reluctant ones who suddenly become extremely enthusiastic; the cowardly ones who suddenly volunteer for dangerous missions; the boisterous ones who become sad; the sad ones who become either boisterous or uncommunicative.
- o Special attention should also be paid to those whose past performance was good but who have suddenly made recent mistakes; to those who are afraid of being disciplined and of losing face; to those who worry about their position and their prestige, and who show frustration and pessimism....

b) Use of the Three-Man Cell: This cell is intended to make people control and educate each other on the basis of mutual help. When they are together they can tell each other their innermost thoughts, and through these we can get to know their ideological changes soon enough to be able to cope with them.

c) Fully employ the hardcore force: Party Chapter and Party Cell leaders, cadres in charge, squad cadres, Executive Committees of Youth Group Chapters, etc.,... should help in the detection, control, and prevention of defections and with indoctrination against defection.

d) Organize a spy network to discover and prevent defection. Use the spy network to discover the symptoms of and the reasons for desertion to the enemy and betrayal of the country. Explain to the spy network the characteristics and activities of the deserters, so that the former will be more efficient in finding out about the situation. At the same time the spy network should be given concrete and detailed orders so that it knows how to deal with the situation when someone deserts.

e) Through investigation and understanding of the situation, suggest measures to tighten organizational control: Set up regulations to govern communication between our soldiers and the enemy's areas, communication between the two areas, the time schedule for internal activities, and inspection of the soldiers. In addition, someone must be on duty every day. These rules are designed to correct organizational faults that could provide opportunities for those who want to desert. Set forth rules for the conduct of mounting patrols and guard.

Post control stations at the main points between our areas and the enemy's. Inspect travel papers to discover forgery by deserters trying to pass control stations.

If it is found that a certain person had the intention of deserting and that he is on a mission near the frontier with the enemy's area, that person should be immediately sent to the rear to be watched. If it is found that he intended to desert from the beginning, then he should not be entrusted with individual missions far from his unit, or with combat missions. In a word, everything should be done to watch and tighten control over his movements. We should always have a plan ready to cope with him when he begins to act on his decision.

3. Check the indications of imminent defection:

When there are rumors about imminent defections, try to find out immediately if they are true, who the would-be defectors are, and who else is involved, so as to be able to devise some effective preventive measure. If the rumors are true, make use of the spy network to find out the defectors' motives and purposes. If in the process of finding out about the accuracy of the rumors there are too many obstacles, then the job should be done or continued in the secure area.

Attention: The truth should be announced as soon as rumors are heard. If the situation is complex but at the same time there are strong indications that the rumors may be true, then preventive measures should be taken, and the process of publicising the truth can continue afterwards. If too much attention is paid to publicity, we may not be able to cope with the situation when it happens.

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4. Measures to deal with the incidents after they have happened:

Desertion and betrayal of the country usually happen before we know about them. Seldom can we take the initiative to prevent desertion, either because we aren't watchful enough or because we are too subjective and don't take preventive measures seriously. It may also happen because there are shortcomings in the carrying out of our missions -- lack of a thorough investigation, slowness in finding out the truth, reluctance to go through all the complexities -- but the main reason is that we aren't watchful enough.

If the incident happens before we know about it, then the following measures should be used:

a) Proceed with the investigation of the incident and the effect it has made on those remaining. Find out who the deserter is, the extent of the effect of his action, the reason for and circumstances of his desertion -- time, location, means and tactics, motives, the deserter's origins, thoughts, relationships, and political views from the beginning. Find out if there are others in the group who are still left behind. Find out if anyone has helped [the deserter], shown him the road, or induced him to defect. Find out if the ringleader is still hiding nearby and take action to cope with the situation. If the deserter is [a former] enemy soldier who defected to our side previously, then find out if he was a spy sent by the enemy's intelligence network to our organization (to sabotage, to gather news, or to capture weapons).

b) Proceed to track the deserter down. This should be done fast and in accord with the concrete facts of the incident, so that effective measures for tracking down the deserter can be taken. These measures will depend on three factors: time, location, and the means of escape.

After the incident has happened, if there is some hope that the deserter can be recaptured, the tracking-down process should be carried out in the following manner: Notify all the organizations, troops, security sections, guerrillas, liaison stations, control stations, and the units that are stationed near the communication routes concerning the deserter's appearance, name, age, and time and date of desertion, so they can stop the deserter if he happens to pass by. Keep a watch on the families the deserter knows and which live along the route he may follow. Keep a watch on other families that the deserter may visit in order to rest, ask for information, change clothes, or obtain food before continuing his journey.

Guess what route the deserter may take and use short-cuts to capture him. Have the spy network station watchers at the main points along the communication routes between our area and the enemy's to look for the deserter day and night. Once he has been spotted, the fact should be communicated immediately so that he can be recaptured in good time.

If he is recaptured, he should first be searched for weapons and documents. After that statements should be taken right on the spot. Ask about his motives and

purposes, and about his accomplices. Find out what he took with him and whether he destroyed anything when he was recaptured. All these facts should be determined since they will serve to [help our cadres] estimate his intentions and proceed with other preventive measures.

c) Find out the extent of the harmful effects caused by the traitor's action, so that they can be checked or lessened.

Right after the incident has happened we have to look for the deserter's reasons for leaving, his position, the circumstances of his mission, his cultural level, and his level of understanding, so as to determine how much he knows about our secrets. What information can he give to the enemy, and what harmful effects can this information have on us if the enemy uses it? From there we can devise a plan to protect our forces and lessen the number of casualties which this [leakage of] information may cause to the troops.

Inform our networks operating in the enemy's areas so they can change their mode of operation and their combat plan. Move networks familiar to the traitor to protect them against surprise attack, shelling, ambush, etc....

Send out false rumors to create suspicion between the deserter and the enemy so that the latter doesn't dare to use the deserter's services, but mistreats him instead. In order to give us time to protect our forces, false rumors should be based on actual situation. We have to take advantage of the present conditions so as to be able to keep our tactics a secret and to get the

enemy to fall into the trap.

5. Continue to gather information concerning the deserter and use it later in devising preventive measures and means to fight the enemy.

a) In gathering information concerning the deserter special attention should be paid to:

- his origins (this can be added later).
- his reasons, motives, and purposes in deserting; his situation and activities; the crimes he committed before, during, and after desertion; his work for the enemy.

Attention: try to get his real last name, age, and physical characteristics. Try to get a photograph of him. Everything that has any relationship to the deserter should be gathered and kept carefully.

b) Keeping these papers will help us if the enemy, after getting all the deserter's information, sends him back into our ranks by changing his name and his [account of his] origin, and by taking advantage of the confusion caused by the war. He might be sent to the troop units or other civilian and local organizations of different areas. We must not commit the mistake of arresting the wrong person or releasing the wrong person....

Usually after the war, some of them are killed, some go abroad to work for a living, others join the anti-revolutionary organizations abroad and put their service at the disposal of the enemy. The enemy may send them back for special activities or let them stay behind to gather intelligence information.

c) Keeping information concerning the deserter is the responsibility of the local cadres. They should report their findings to the high echelons (military zone).

This is one of the important aspects of our struggle with the enemy. Only if we realize the fact that we may have to fight the enemy for a long time to come will we be able to take special care in protecting, gathering, and keeping the documents concerning deserters and traitors.

V. Conclusion

Desertion, betrayal of the country -- is one of the most dangerous actions. It not only brings more casualties and material damage to the revolution but it also damages the glorious reputation of the army. Therefore, the leaders, the commanders of all branches of service, and all soldiers bear the responsibility of fighting against this phenomenon in order to protect the army and the revolution.

Appendix C

PROFILE OF 1348 QUY CHANH FOR LAST SIX MONTHS OF 1965

Only very general statistics are available on the Vietnamese who have left the Viet Cong and become participants in the GVN Chieu Hoi Program. The official figures available from the government agency show the total number of Quy Chanh by province for one week periods.* They also show the composition of the Quy Chanh by total military and total civilian ex-Viet Cong and by draft dodgers and deserters from the GVN. Along with these data, a summary of the number of Quy Chanh since the program's inception in February 1963 is given.

From available reports, whether official or unofficial, it is not possible to find out very much about the Quy Chanh. For example, no continuing records are kept as to how many of the military are from the Main Force, Local Force, and village and hamlet guerrilla units; how many are cadres; and how long each spent with the Viet Cong. And no running tally is kept as to the aspirations of the Quy Chanh when he leaves the center.

Fortunately, a card reporting system was put into effect in mid-summer 1965. Under this system, a card with several duplicates is filled out for every Quy Chanh. The card contains the name, vital statistics, date and place of defection, Viet Cong rank and position,

* Tinh Hinh Quy Chanh Tai Cac Dia-Phuong (Status of Quy Chanh by Provinces), published weekly by the Special Commissariat for Chieu Hoi, Saigon, South Vietnam.

past Viet Cong activities, area of activity, weapons turned in, documents turned in, and aspirations.

This appendix presents results of data tabulated from 1348 of these cards describing Quy Chanh who left the Viet Cong during the last six months of 1965. These 1348 cards are all that have been made available by the Chieu Hoi agency to U.S. agencies. It is understood that these are all that have been sent to Saigon by Chieu Hoi field units, as of this study's cutoff date.

So far as we can determine from quick analyses of comparable figures (for example, on distributions by age or by Corps areas, on ratio of military to civilian personnel, and on length of service), this sample is fairly representative of the total body of Quy Chanh who came in during the period, and the data derived from the cards are reasonably close to those derived from descriptions of the 151 persons who compose the total RAND sample of ralliers. The card data are not closely comparable to the over-all data from the field for particular points of time, because of the time lag in reporting: Over-all figures are transmitted from field units to Saigon more promptly than the cards with their more detailed data.

The most interesting finding from the card data is a surprisingly high ratio of cadres to non-cadres among Quy Chanh who were formerly in the Main or Local Forces. Cadres made up 24 per cent of Main Force Quy Chanh, 27 per cent of Local Forces Quy Chanh, and 15 per cent of civilian Quy Chanh who came in during the last half of 1965. Table I gives the numbers of cadres and of all

Table I

CADRES IN QUY CHANH CARD SAMPLE*

Month of Rally	_ Ratios of Cadres to Total Quy Chanh			
	Main Force	Local Force	Guerrilla	Civilian
July	1:2	0:5	5:29	0:13
August	2:7	1:13	11:109	10:72
September	4:19	6:30	11:219	18:96
October	6:19	8:22	14:179	14:93
November	3:20	3:11	11:134	8:48
December	3:12	6:8	16:82	3:22
Total	19,77	24:89	68:762	53:344
Cadres as % of Total	24	27	9	15

* In the card sample there were 142 former GVN adherents (10.7 per cent of the total) and 30 guerrillas who rallied rather than be transferred to the Main Force.

ralliers in the card sample, expressed as ratios per month (July through December 1965) by major force categories. Ranks of these cadres are given in Tables II and III.

Table II
RANK OF CADRES IN CARD SAMPLE BY FORCE CATEGORY

Rank	Main Force	Local Force	Guerrillas		Militia	
			Village	Hamlet	Village	Hamlet
Plat. Ldr.	3	2	2	-	-	-
Asst/Plat. Leader	5	3	-	-	-	-
Sqd. Ldr.	4	9	19	7	2	2
Asst/Sqd. Leader	7	9	21	5	1	-
Military Officials	-	-	6	3	-	-

Table III
RANK OF CIVILIAN CADRES IN CARD SAMPLE

Regional Official	1
Province Official	1
District Official	8
Village Official	28
Hamlet Official	15

The distribution of guerrilla forces (the lowest general classification of Viet Cong) among village guerrillas, militia, and liaison personnel, and hamlet guerrillas, militia, and liaison personnel, is of some interest. Table IV shows this distribution for the 762 guerrillas in the sample of 1348 Quy Chanh.

Table IV
DISTRIBUTION OF 762 GUERRILLAS IN CARD SAMPLE
BY BRANCH OF SERVICE

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Village Level.....	496		65
Guerrillas..(374)			
Militia.....(109)			
Liaison.....(13)			
Hamlet Level.....	266		35
Guerrillas..(258)			
Militia.....(8)			
Total	762		100

It is noteworthy that nearly twice as many village-level guerrillas are rallying as less important hamlet guerrillas.

Table V shows the age distribution of the sample of 1348 Quy Chanh broken down according to civilian or military service. Notable in this distribution is the relatively heavy concentration of youths in military service (19 per cent of those in the sample were 17 years old or younger). Since only about 4 per cent of the military can be classified as new recruits (persons with

Table V. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF 1348 QUY CHANH IN CARD SAMPLE

<u>Age</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Total</u>
12	0	2	2
13	2	2	4
14	4	8	12
15	8	57	65
16	13	46	59
17	12	81	93
18	19	83	102
19	21	57	78
20	17	57	74
21	9	53	62
22	20	49	69
23	9	58	67
24	18	60	78
25	19	47	66
26	6	38	44
27	11	29	40
28	12	52	64
29	12	21	33
30	11	22	33
31	4	23	27
32	11	23	34
33	11	28	39
34	8	20	28
35	14	31	45
36	2	9	11
37	8	11	19
38	8	13	21
39	3	6	9
40	7	3	10
41	3	0	3
42	2	5	7
43	4	2	6
44	3	0	3
45	5	4	9
46	3	3	6
47	2	2	4
48	1	0	1
49	4	1	5
50	2	0	2
51	1	0	1
52	2	0	2
53	1	0	1
54	0	0	0
55	1	0	1
56	0	0	0
57	1	0	1
58	1	0	1
59	3	0	3
60	0	0	0
61	1	0	1
62	0	0	0
63	1	0	1
64	2	0	2
Total	342	1006	1348

less than two months of service in the VC, and on the way to join their units), it follows that a large percentage of the ralliers below the age of 18 were serving as members of hamlet forces. They were in part replacing older VC sent away to Local or to Main Force units; in part contributing to the general buildup of VC forces.

Of those in the sample who were in military units, 28 per cent were 18 or younger; 18 per cent of the civilians were 18 or below. As a class, the civilians were older: About 25 per cent were 35 years old or more. Only about 9 per cent of the military were in this bracket.

Mention is occasionally made of the presence of females in the Front. We have no figures showing the proportion of females to males in the VC forces as a whole. But our sample of 1348 Quy Chanh indicates that female VC do rally. Table VI shows their number, by type of force and rank.

Table VI
FEMALES IN THE CARD SAMPLE

	<u>Number</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Main Force.....	1	-
Nurse.....	(1)	
Guerrillas.....	11	1.1 (of all guerrillas)
Cadre.....	(1)	
Rank & File.....	(10)	
Civilians	44	12.8 (of all civilians)
Cadres.....	(2)	
Rank & File.....	(42)	